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Abstract
We leverage survey data from Germany, Italy, and the US to document several novel
stylized facts about the extent of information frictions among firms and households.
First, firms’ expectations about the central bank policy rate, inflation, and aggregate
unemployment are more aligned with expert forecasts and less dispersed than house-
holds’. Second, there is substantially more heterogeneity in information frictions
within households than within firms. Third, consistent with firms having stronger
priors, they update their policy rate expectations significantly less compared to house-
holds when provided with an expert forecast. Our results have important implica-
tions for modeling heterogeneity in macroeconomic models.
JEL Classification: D83, D84, E71
Keywords: Information frictions, firms, households, expectation formation, interest rates.
∗Sebastian Link, ifo Institute, LMU Munich, IZA, CESifo, e-mail: Link@ifo.de; Andreas Peichl,
LMU Munich, ifo Institute, e-mail: peichl@econ.lmu.de; Christopher Roth, University of Warwick, briq,
CESifo, Cage Warwick, CEPR, e-mail: Christopher.Roth@warwick.ac.uk; Johannes Wohlfart, Depart-
ment of Economics and CEBI, University of Copenhagen, CESifo, Danish Finance Institute, e-mail: jo-
hannes.wohlfart@econ.ku.dk. We are grateful to Mirko Wiederholt and Basit Zafar and conference and
seminar audiences at the 11th ifo Conference on Macroeconomics and Survey Data and the Banque de
France for helpful comments. Cecilie Christensen, Timo Haller, Hrishikesh Iyengar, and Florian Schoner
provided excellent research assistance. We thank Jeppe Druedahl for help on the initial survey design. We
thank the Economic Policy Research Network (EPRN) for co-funding this project and the survey depart-
ment of the ifo Institute, in particular Katrin Demmelhuber, Felix Leiss, Agnesa Nimanaj, Klaus Wohlrabe,
and Sigrid Zengel-Fehr for their help and the opportunity to conduct a special firm survey and to add sup-
plementary questions to existing firm surveys. We thank Brent Meyer, Brian Prescott, and the Research and
Data Division of the Atlanta Fed for providing us access to the Business Inflation Expectations Survey. We
thank M&G Investments and in particular Ana Gil for providing access to the M&G YouGov Inflation Ex-
pectations Survey. The activities of CEBI are financed by the Danish National Research Foundation, Grant
DNRF134. We received ethics approval from the University of Warwick.
1 Introduction
Information frictions are at the core of models of expectation formation in macroeco-
nomics (Sims, 2003a; Woodford, 2003). Such frictions can explain various empirical puz-
zles and stylized facts, and have important implications for the transmission of monetary
and fiscal policy (Ball et al., 2005; Paciello and Wiederholt, 2014). The extent of informa-
tion frictions likely varies across groups of agents in the economy, for instance, due to
differences in stake size or information acquisition and processing costs (D’Acunto et al.,
2019a; Fuster et al., 2020; Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Reis, 2006a,b). Given the im-
portance of information frictions for expectation formation, it is crucial for both modeling
choices and policy making to understand how the degree of these frictions differs across
and within groups of decision makers in the economy.
In this paper we examine the relative strength of information frictions among firms
and households in the context of expectations about inflation, unemployment, and the
central bank’s policy rate.1 Forecasting macroeconomic developments accurately is cen-
tral for firms to predict their future product demand or the cost of raising capital. House-
holds have an interest in holding accurate expectations about changes in the cost of living,
the real interest rate earned on savings or paid on loans, or the development of the labor
market. Both firms and households may therefore perceive high stakes in being informed
about macroeconomic developments. At the same time, managers may face lower costs
of acquiring and processing macroeconomic information than households.
We leverage micro data from Germany, Italy, and the US to document several novel
stylized facts about the extent of information frictions among firms and households. Our
main evidence draws on two sets of almost identical surveys of in total 4,219 German
firms and 4,925 households broadly representative of the German population, conducted
at the same points in time. A key aspect of our firm surveys is that they are answered
by managers who are responsible for high-stakes economic decisions in these firms. Cru-
1For convenience and in line with the convention in macroeconomics, we use the term “firm expecta-
tions” to describe the expectations of managers of these firms.
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cially, our surveys use identical framing of key questions on expectations, addressing the
importance of wording choices, e.g., when asking about inflation (de Bruin et al., 2012).
Hence, our setup ensures a high level of comparability of survey responses between firms
and households, allowing us to provide novel evidence on heterogeneity in information
frictions. In addition, we draw on 3,295 and 6,311 survey observations from Italian firms
and households, respectively, as well as survey data from 582 firm observations and 503
household observations from the US to probe the external validity of our main findings.
In the surveys conducted with German firms and households in September 2020, we
elicit expectations about inflation and unemployment in 2022, as well as the policy rate
of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2022 and 2025. We document that firms’ expec-
tations about policy rates, inflation, and unemployment are substantially less dispersed
than those of households, and on average closely aligned with expert forecasts, consis-
tent with a stronger degree of information frictions among households. The differences
between households and firms are large: mean absolute deviations from expert bench-
marks among firms are 0.38 percentage points for the policy rate in 2022, 0.94 percentage
points for the inflation rate, and 1.93 percentage points for the unemployment rate, while
they are much higher at 2.08, 3.23 and 6.11 percentage points, respectively, for house-
holds. We confirm our finding of lower dispersion and smaller deviations from expert
benchmarks in firms’ expectations compared to households’ using representative survey
data on inflation expectations from the US and Italy.
Leveraging the richness of our German survey data, we next examine heterogeneity
in information frictions within each group of agents. We split the household and the
firm sample into “sophisticated” and “non-sophisticated” respondents according to vari-
ables that are associated with significant differences in expectations. The expectations of
a group of “sophisticated households” with higher numeracy, age, and financial wealth
are indistinguishable from those of firms. In contrast, expectations of “non-sophisticated”
firms, i.e., smaller and non-exporting firms, are still much closer to “sophisticated” firms’
expectations compared to households’. This suggests that there is substantially more het-
erogeneity in information frictions within households than within firms.
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Are differences in expectations about the future between firms and households due
to differential informedness about current realizations of macroeconomic variables? We
provide random subsets of respondents in our German surveys from September 2020
with information about the current policy rate of zero percent before they make their pre-
dictions about future rates. Households’ expectations about future policy rates become
significantly less dispersed and shift towards expert forecasts when learning about the
current policy rate. This finding is striking given that the policy rate had been at the zero
lower bound for 4.5 years at the time of our survey. It is not easily explained by sticky in-
formation models in which households update their information sets every few quarters
on average, but suggests that a fraction of households are completely inattentive to policy
rates. By contrast, information about the current policy rate has only negligible effects on
firms’ expectations about future rates. Our estimates reveal that approximately 50 percent
of the difference between firms’ and households’ expectations about future policy rates is
eliminated when respondents are informed about the current rate. This indicates that dif-
ferential knowledge about current economic conditions potentially explains a large part
of the substantial differences in expectations about the future between households and
firms.
To study the strength of households’ and firms’ prior expectations about monetary
policy, we conducted additional surveys with German firms in December 2019, in which
we randomly assign our respondents into groups receiving differential truthful expert
forecasts about the likely date of a hike in the ECB policy rate. Subsequently, we elicit
a broad range of expectations about future policy rates, personal interest rates, as well
as other macroeconomic and personal outcomes. We find that firms update their expec-
tations about policy rates significantly less than households in response to the provision
of the same expert forecasts, consistent with firms holding stronger priors about future
ECB monetary policy. Firms report to have acquired more information about monetary
policy than households over the weeks before the survey, which may contribute to their
stronger priors. Furthermore, while households significantly change their expectations
about interest rates they will personally face on savings accounts and loans, firms do not
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adjust their expectations about own loan rates in response to the expert forecast. Changes
in households’ expectations about policy rates and own rates persist at a reduced size
in a four-week follow-up survey. Taken together, these pieces of evidence further sup-
port the notion that information frictions are less pronounced among firms than among
households.
Our findings have important implications for macroeconomic modeling choices. First,
the differences in belief dispersion across groups of households and across groups of firms
highlight the importance of incorporating heterogeneity into macroeconomic models, es-
pecially on the household side. Second, the differences in information frictions between
firms and households indicate that abstracting from information frictions is a less rea-
sonable approximation for households than for firms. Third, our results suggest that the
practice of using professional forecasts as a proxy for beliefs of households and firms
when no direct expectations data from these groups are available is more difficult to de-
fend for households than for firms.
We contribute to a growing literature studying firm expectations (Bachmann et al.,
2018, 2020, 2013; Coibion et al., 2020b, 2018c; Dovern et al., 2020; Enders et al., 2019a,b,
2020; Frache and Lluberas, 2018).2 Most closely related, Coibion et al. (2018b) conduct sur-
veys on macroeconomic beliefs among firms in New Zealand and document a number of
novel stylized facts. They show that firms’ macroeconomic expectations, especially about
inflation, share two important characteristics with those of households: wide disagree-
ment and an upward bias compared to expert forecasts.3 We contribute to this literature
by studying the relative importance of information frictions among these two groups us-
ing our own tailored surveys of both firms and households conducted at identical points
in time. Consistent with Coibion et al. (2018b) we document important disagreement and
an upward bias in firms’ inflation expectations compared to experts.
However, in contrast to Coibion et al. (2018b), our micro data for three different ma-
2We also contribute to a broader literature on information provision experiments. For a review of this
literature, see Haaland et al. (2020).
3We use the term “bias” to describe deviations from expert forecasts for readability. Of course, expert
forecasts may themselves be biased, e.g., due to reputational concerns in forecasting.
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jor industrialized countries reveal that information frictions seem to be substantially less
pronounced among firms than among households. Reweighting our sample of German
firms to mimic the firm sample of Coibion et al. (2018b) we show that these contrast-
ing findings are only partly explained by observable differences between firms in New
Zealand and Germany, such as firm size and export share. Moreover, our data allow us
to compare the differences in information frictions between households and firms not
only for inflation expectations as in Coibion et al. (2018b), but also for unemployment
and central bank policy rate expectations. In addition, we use simple variation in infor-
mation about the realizations of macroeconomic variables to show that a large fraction of
differences in expectations about the future between firms and households are driven by
higher informedness about current realizations of macroeconomic variables among firms
as compared to households.
We also add to a literature studying the way households form expectations about
macroeconomic variables (Armona et al., 2019; Bachmann et al., 2015; Bailey et al., 2018;
Cavallo et al., 2017; Coibion et al., 2018a; D’Acunto et al., 2019b; Fetzer et al., 2020; Fuster
et al., 2020; Giglio et al., 2020; Goldfayn-Frank and Wohlfart, 2020; Hanspal et al., 2020;
Kuchler and Zafar, 2019; Malmendier and Nagel, 2016; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020; Roth
et al., 2020). Several papers study households’ expectation formation in the context of
monetary policy (Andre et al., 2019; Coibion et al., 2020c; D’Acunto et al., 2019a). For
instance, Coibion et al. (2019) examine how households’ inflation expectations respond
to the provision of different pieces of information about the conduct of monetary policy
in the US. Coibion et al. (2020a) provide large-scale evidence that information treatments
about current and next year’s policy rates have strong effects on household expectations
but treatments beyond one year do not have any additional impact. Our setting differs
in that the ECB policy rate had been at the zero lower bound for a long time at the time
of our surveys, while Coibion et al. (2020a) study an environment of positive policy rates
in the US. At the zero lower bound, policy makers often resort to unconventional mea-
sures whose transmission heavily depends on the degree of information frictions, such as
forward guidance about future interest rates (Wiederholt, 2015).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides descriptive ev-
idence on differences in information frictions between households and firms leveraging
rich micro data from Germany, the US, and Italy. In Section 3, we describe how house-
holds and firms update their expectations in response to expert forecasts about the future
ECB policy rate. Section 4 concludes.
2 Descriptive Evidence on Information Frictions
In this section we use data from our own September 2020 surveys in Germany as well as
existing survey data from the US and Italy to provide descriptive evidence on informa-
tion frictions among firms and among households.4 In line with much of the macroeco-
nomic literature, we use the extent of disagreement and deviation from expert forecasts in
macroeconomic expectations within a group of economic agents as proxy for the degree
of information frictions within this group (see, e.g., Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012). In
most prevalent models of information frictions, there is a close correspondence between
disagreement and the extent of information frictions. For instance, a higher frequency
of updating information sets will reduce disagreement in Calvo-style sticky information
models (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Mankiw et al., 2003), and higher signal-to-noise ratios in
private signals about the economy will be reflected in lower dispersion in noisy informa-
tion models (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Sims, 2003b; Woodford, 2003).5
2.1 Samples of September 2020 Surveys
Firm Sample We leverage the ifo Business Survey (IBS), which is conducted by the ifo
Institute on a monthly basis, and which aims to be representative of the German econ-
4Table A.1 in the Online Appendix provides an overview of the different datasets used in this paper.
5Recent evidence highlights heterogeneity in households’ beliefs about the reaction of the economy to
shocks, which may generate disagreement in expectations even if information sets are identical (Andre
et al., 2019). Moreover, deviations from expert forecasts may be driven by distrust towards experts. In
our paper, we abstract from such alternative drivers and use disagreement and deviations from expert
forecasts as a proxy for information frictions. In Section 3 we study the strength of priors about future
macroeconomic developments as an alternative measure of information frictions.
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omy. The survey provides the basis for the ifo Business Climate Index, the most recog-
nized leading indicator of the German business cycle. Every month approximately 9,000
survey participants from firms in manufacturing, services, construction, wholesale, and
retail assess various dimensions of their business activities, including their current and
expected business conditions for the next six months.6 The IBS has been used extensively
in previous research in economics (e.g. Bachmann et al., 2019, 2013; Balleer et al., 2020;
Buchheim et al., 2020; Enders et al., 2019b; Link, 2019). More than 90% of respondents
are in an upper management position such as owner, CEO, or department head (Sauer
and Wohlrabe, 2019). Hence, we survey individuals that are responsible for high-stakes
economic decisions in these firms.
The supplementary questions used in our study were added to the online portion
of the September 2020 wave of the IBS covering 4,528 firms in manufacturing, services,
retail, and wholesale. In total, 3,748 firms (83 percent) responded to our additional survey
questions. Panel A of Table A.2 in the Online Appendix shows summary statistics of our
firm sample. 37 percent of the firms operate in the manufacturing sector, 38 percent in
services sectors, and 26 percent of firms are retailers or wholesalers. The average (median)
number of employees is 313 (42), the average (median) firm age is 53 years (38 years), and
the average (median) share of exports in the firms’ revenue is 18 percent (9 percent). 64
percent of respondents from the sample hold a university degree.
Household Sample We collect a sample of 961 German respondents in collaboration
with the online panel provider Dynata, which is widely used in the social sciences (Haa-
land et al., 2020). We drop respondents in the top and bottom percent of response time,
as these respondents were likely inattentive to the survey. This leaves us with a sam-
ple of 933 respondents. Panel A of Table A.3 in the Online Appendix shows summary
statistics of our household sample for the September 2020 survey, and a comparison with
benchmarks from the 2017 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a repre-
6See Sauer and Wohlrabe (2020) for details on the survey and Lehmann (2020) for a documentation
of the very high forecasting power of IBS-based indicators with respect to aggregate administrative data
including GDP, industrial production, employment, investment, exports, and prices.
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sentative household survey. Our sample is roughly representative of the population in
terms of gender, age, region, and total household income. The main difference of our
sample to the population is a higher share of highly educated individuals, which is a
common feature in online surveys.
2.2 Design of September 2020 Surveys
Firms Due to space constraints, each firm participating in the survey only responds to
two questions in total (in addition to the regular questions). All firms respond to one
question about the policy rate. Two thirds of the firms report their expectations about
the ECB policy rate in 2022. The remaining firms are asked for the expected rate in 2025.
We cross-randomize across respondents whether they are told that the current policy rate
is zero percent before making their prediction about future policy rates.7 In addition,
respondents are either asked to predict the inflation rate in 2022 or the unemployment
rate in 2022, or are asked about their trust in economic forecasts by experts. We also
randomize whether the policy rate question or the other question is asked first. Online
Appendix E.1 documents the exact survey instructions.
Households Crucially, we use identical framing of key questions on expectations in the
household survey as in the firm survey, ruling out that wording choices are driving dif-
ferences in reported expectations (de Bruin et al., 2012). We first elicit respondents’ ex-
pectations about the ECB policy rate in 2022 and in 2025, as well as their confidence in
these predictions. The order of the questions on the two horizons is randomized. More-
over, a random half of our respondents is informed that the current policy rate is zero
percent before making their prediction about future policy rates.8 Then, we ask our re-
spondents to predict the average unemployment rate and the inflation rate in 2022, and
elicit their confidence in these estimates. We randomize the order in which expectations
7Columns 5 and 6 of Table A.2 Panel A in the Online Appendix show that our firm sample is balanced
between those who received the current rate and those who did not according to some key covariates.
8Columns 6 and 7 of Table A.3 Panel A in the Online Appendix show that our household sample is
balanced across these two arms according to some key covariates.
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about policy rates, inflation, and unemployment are elicited. We also include questions
on various individual characteristics, such as household finances, labor market behavior,
and numeracy. Furthermore, we elicit the respondents’ trust in expert forecasts about the
economy. Online Appendix E.2 documents the exact survey instructions.
Coding of Outcome Variables Our main survey items of interest are point forecasts of
economic variables. As it is common in survey data, the responses to these questions
contain some extreme outliers. Extreme responses could indicate typos, inattention to
the survey, or respondents not taking the survey seriously. Even if extreme responses
reflect true beliefs, those responses could be driving estimation results due to the sen-
sitivity of OLS to outliers. We therefore trim predictions about interest rates, inflation,
and unemployment at -1 and 25 percent, 0 and 35 percent, and 0 and 50 percent, respec-
tively, commonly for the firm and household samples. This results in setting between
three and four percent of responses in the household sample and less than one percent in
the firm sample to missing. In our figures, we mostly winsorize these variables at lower
values for expositional reasons. None of our findings are sensitive to the exact trimming
or winsorization procedures used.
2.3 Descriptive Results
We start by presenting expectations about policy rates, the unemployment rate, and the
inflation rate from the groups of households and firms that were not provided with infor-
mation about the current policy rate.
Figure 1 displays the cumulative density function of firms’ and households’ expecta-
tions about the ECB policy rate in 2022 and 2025, inflation in 2022, and the unemployment
rate in 2022.9 We compare predictions about the policy rate in 2022 to the median expert
forecast from the October 2020 round of the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (0%),
and the predictions about inflation and unemployment in the “Joint Economic Forecast”
9For the sake of readability, we winsorize expectations in Figure 1 at -1 and 10, 0 and 10, and 0 and 20
for policy rates, inflation, and unemployment, respectively.
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of Germany’s leading economic research institutes (1.6 and 5.5%, respectively), which
was published in October 2020 (Joint Economic Forecast, 2020).10
Firms’ expectations are much less dispersed and more aligned with the expert bench-
marks compared to households’. Table 1 shows that the standard deviation of house-
holds’ expectations is between 2.9 and 5.7 times higher than for firms, while the interquar-
tile range is between 2.4 and 4 times higher (between 2.5 and 5 times for the difference be-
tween 90th and 10th percentile). Moreover, mean absolute deviations from expert bench-
marks are 0.4 for the policy rate in 2022, 0.9 for the inflation rate, and 1.9 for the unem-
ployment rate for firms, while they are much higher at 2.1, 3.2, and 6.1, respectively, for
households. Both firms and households over-predict interest rates, inflation, and unem-
ployment relative to experts, on average and at the median.
Our first main result can be summarized as follows:
Result 1. Firm expectations about policy rates, inflation, and unemployment are less dispersed
and more closely aligned with expert forecasts than household expectations.
Robustness A potential concern is that our survey was conducted during the coron-
avirus pandemic and that patterns of information acquisition and information frictions
are unusual during this time. In Online Appendix B we provide evidence from surveys
conducted in Germany in September and December 2019, i.e., before the pandemic, that
firm expectations are less dispersed and more aligned with expert predictions than house-
hold expectations.
In addition, we compare the expectations of households in the September 2020 wave
who worry about personal health or economic consequences of the coronavirus to the ex-
pectations of those who do not (see Figure A.2). Similarly, we display separately the dis-
tribution of expectations for firms that report that their business activity was negatively
affected by the pandemic and for those reporting a non-negative impact (see Figure A.3).
The figures suggest that more exposure to the pandemic is associated with only slightly
10The “Joint Economic Forecast” (“Gemeinschaftsdiagnose”) is used by the German Federal government
for its own economic outlook and planning over the next years.
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more dispersed expectations, and somewhat higher deviations from expert benchmarks.
Non-exposed households still exhibit substantially higher dispersion and bias than ex-
posed firms. Thus, our finding of differences in information frictions between households
and firms does not seem to be driven by the special circumstances of the coronavirus pan-
demic.
2.4 Correlates of Beliefs
Firms We leverage our rich data on background characteristics to study the correlates of
expectations and absolute deviations of beliefs from expert benchmarks. Table 2 displays
multivariate regressions of these outcomes on respondent characteristics. The results
show that firms with more employees hold expectations that are more closely aligned
with those of experts for inflation (p < 0.01) and unemployment (p < 0.01). Firms that
have experienced a change to their loan interest rate over the previous six months hold
less biased beliefs about policy rates (p < 0.1).11 Moreover, firms with a higher subjective
exposure to the coronavirus crisis expect higher rates of inflation (p < 0.1) and unem-
ployment (p < 0.01) in 2022. Managers of firms with a higher export share (p < 0.01),
managers of services firms (p < 0.01) or of firms in retail and wholesale (p < 0.05), and
more educated managers (p < 0.1) display significantly lower deviations in their inflation
expectations from expert forecasts. We find no systematic patterns according to firm age,
the equity ratio, or the ratio of cash to total assets.
Households Table 3 presents the results of the corresponding analysis for households.
The results show that higher financial asset holdings are associated with policy rate and
11The covariates “Equity ratio”, “Cash to total assets” ratio, and “Any change in loan interest rate in last
6 months” are elicited in supplementary survey questions in the September 2020 wave of the IBS. These
questions were answered by 82%, 55%, and 82% of firms in our sample, respectively. Moreover, we use
survey information on firms’ subjective exposure to the coronavirus crisis elicited in the September 2020
IBS (reported by 97% of firms in the sample) and the degree of schooling the survey respondent com-
pleted elicited in February 2020 (82%). “Firm age” and “Export share” are calculated from responses to the
September 2018 IBS wave. We code missing values of all covariates (exempt the export share which we set
to the average of the two-digit industry if missing) to zero and include dummies indicating missings in the
respective variable. See Appendix E.1 for translated survey instructions.
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inflation expectations that are more closely aligned with expert benchmarks (p < 0.01),
while homeownership is associated with more biased expectations about these outcomes
(mostly p < 0.05). This is consistent with higher stakes among households investing in
financial assets, as the real return on these assets is affected by movements in interest
rates and inflation, while real estate holdings should be protected from movements in
nominal rates or inflation. We find no patterns according to financial asset holdings or
homeownership for expectations about aggregate unemployment.
Moreover, more numerate respondents’ macroeconomic expectations are more closely
aligned with expert benchmarks (p < 0.01).12 Figure A.4 highlights for the no-anchor
condition that the dispersion of expectations is higher among respondents with lower
numeracy. These findings are consistent with i) less numerate respondents facing higher
information acquisition or processing costs and therefore being less well-informed, or
ii) less numerate respondents holding different beliefs about how macroeconomic vari-
ables, such a policy rates, are determined (i.e., holding a different “mental model”). These
findings are in line with recent evidence on an important role of cognitive constraints in
macroeconomic expectation formation of households (D’Acunto et al., 2019b). We sim-
ilarly find that higher education is associated with somewhat smaller deviations from
expert benchmarks. Given these findings, the fact that our sample is more highly edu-
cated on average than the population implies that our descriptive evidence on differences
between firms and households should be interpreted as a lower bound.
We also find that individuals who agree that a recession would worsen their house-
holds’ financial situation (51 percent of our sample) have less biased beliefs about the
unemployment rate (p < 0.01). This is consistent with causal evidence in Roth et al.
(2020) that higher perceived risk exposure increases the demand for macroeconomic in-
formation, in line with models of endogenous information acquisition.
Moreover, consistent with prior evidence (e.g., D’Acunto et al., 2020), the expectations
12We measure numeracy using seven questions adapted from the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer
Expectations (see documentation of questions in Section E.2 in the Online Appendix), and define respon-
dents who respond to at least six questions correctly as highly numerate (46 percent of our sample).
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of females are less well-aligned with expert forecasts (mostly p < 0.05). Older individ-
uals hold expectations that are more consistent with those of experts (p < 0.01), in line
with models of learning over the life-cycle. Other demographic characteristics, such as
employment status, are uncorrelated with expectations.13
2.5 Within-Group Heterogeneity
We next assess the extent of heterogeneity in information frictions within households and
within firms. For both firms and households we define a group of “sophisticated” and
“non-sophisticated” agents based on a few observables that are most predictive of hold-
ing expectations that are more consistent with expert benchmarks. For households, we
study a group of “sophisticated” households aged 50 or higher with high numeracy and
above-median financial assets, which have had more time to learn over the life cycle, ar-
guably face lower information acquisition and processing costs, and have higher stakes
in being informed (at least about inflation and nominal rates). Along these lines, we label
19 percent of our respondents as “sophisticated”. As shown in Figure A.5 in the On-
line Appendix for the no-anchor condition, the expectations of this group are much less
dispersed and more aligned with expert benchmarks compared to expectations of “non-
sophisticated” households. Indeed, mean absolute deviations from expert benchmarks in
this group are 0.5, 1.1, and 2.7 for the policy rate, inflation, and unemployment in 2022 –
almost as low and – in the case of expected policy rate and inflation – statistically indis-
tinguishable from the results in the firm sample.
We also study a group of “non-sophisticated” firms, whose number of employees is
below the sample median and which are not exporting. Figure A.6 in the Online Ap-
pendix plots cumulative distribution functions of the expectations of this group of non-
sophisticated firms (18 percent of respondents), of all other firms (“sophisticated firms”),
13Table A.5 Columns 1-3 show similar evidence on correlates of interest rate expectations from our house-
hold survey from December 2019. Less biased groups are also more likely to follow news about interest
rates (Columns 5-6), and – with the exception of more numerate respondents – are more confident in their
expectations (Column 4).
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and of households. The figure shows that even non-sophisticated firms hold macroe-
conomic expectations that are substantially less dispersed and more aligned with expert
benchmarks compared to the expectations of households. Indeed, differences in mean ab-
solute deviations from expert benchmarks between sophisticated and non-sophisticated
firms are 0.02, 0.4, and 0.2 percentage points for the policy rate, inflation, and unemploy-
ment in 2022, respectively, which is only statistically different for the case of inflation
expectations. In contrast, differences between non-sophisticated firms and households
are much larger at 1.7, 2, and 4, and highly significant in all cases (p < 0.01).
Thus, disagreement and deviations from expert forecasts seem to differ more strongly
across different groups of households than across different groups of firms. Our second
main result can thus be summarized as follows:
Result 2. The degree of information frictions varies substantially more within households than
within firms.
2.6 The Effects of the Anchor on Beliefs
Is uninformedness about current realizations of macroeconomic variables driving differ-
ences in expectations about the future between households and firms? We examine this
question by comparing expectations between respondents who received an anchor about
the current ECB policy rate before making their predictions and those who did not.
Households who received the anchor expect policy rates for 2022 and 2025 that are
lower by 0.80 percentage points (p < 0.01) and 0.60 percentage points (p < 0.05), respec-
tively (see Table 3). The anchor also reduces the dispersion in household expectations
about future rates (see Panel A of Figure 2). By contrast, the anchor has economically
small and mostly insignificant effects on the level and dispersion of the policy rate expec-
tations of firms (see Table 2 and Panel B of Figure 2). The differences in the effects of the
anchor on policy rate expectations between firms and households are significant at the
1-percent level. As can be seen in Table 1, the difference in the average expected policy
rate for 2022 between firms and households shrinks from 1.8 percentage points in the no
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anchor condition (2.1 percent among households vs. 0.3 percent among firms) to 0.9 per-
centage points in the anchor condition (1.2 vs. 0.3 percent). This highlights that roughly
half of the difference in average beliefs between households and firms can be attributed
to unawareness of the current level of the policy rate among households.14
This finding is quite striking considering that the policy rate had been at the zero lower
bound for 4.5 years at the time of the survey. This is not easily explained by sticky infor-
mation models in which households update their information sets every few quarters on
average, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002) or Carroll (2003), but points to a corner solution
in which groups of households are completely inattentive to policy rates. Our third main
result can be summarized as follows:
Result 3. Household expectations become significantly less dispersed after learning about the cur-
rent ECB policy rate, while firm expectations do not respond. This indicates that uninformedness
about the status quo partially explains the substantial differences in expectations about the future
between households and firms.
2.7 Comparison to Related Evidence
So far, we demonstrated that both firms and households exhibit high levels of disagree-
ment and an upward bias compared to experts in their macroeconomic expectations, con-
sistent with the seminal work by Coibion et al. (2018b) who leverage firm samples from
New Zealand. However, in contrast to Coibion et al. (2018b), information frictions are
more pronounced among households compared to firms in our samples. To reconcile the
differences in findings, we first assess the relevance of observable differences between
firms from New Zealand and Germany. To do so, we conduct a reweighting exercise
(which we describe in detail in Online Appendix C). Using the micro data from New
Zealand, we reweight our sample of German firms to make it similar to their sample of
14Having received the anchor somewhat reduces households’ inflation expectations, consistent with
households inferring from rates being at the zero lower bound to an environment of lower inflation (see
Table 3). The anchor has no significant effect on their unemployment expectations. Due to constraints to
the survey programming, we have no arm in the firm survey in which respondents received information
on the current policy rate before reporting their inflation or unemployment expectations.
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firms from New Zealand in terms of number of employees, export status, and industry
composition.15 Table A.4 and Figure A.7 in the Online Appendix show that the gap in av-
erage inflation expectations between households and firms closes by approximately 10%
(p < 0.05) once we reweight the sample.16 This is consistent with our finding that ex-
porters and larger firms exhibit smaller biases in inflation expectations (see Table 2). The
remaining unexplained part of the gap in expectations could result from differences in (i)
the institutional and economic setting (New Zealand versus Germany), (ii) other, unob-
servable characteristics of firms, (iii) the different timing of surveys (2013-2017 vs. 2019-
2020), or (iv) the differences in forecast horizons (12 month forecast horizon in Coibion et
al. (2018b) compared to 15 to 27 months in our case). In the next subsection we confirm
our findings using data on 12 month-ahead inflation expectations between 2013 and 2019
from households and firms in other major economies.
2.8 Evidence from the United States and Italy
To probe the robustness and generalizability of our findings, we use micro data on infla-
tion expectations from representative surveys with firms and households in the United
States and Italy.
For the United States, we leverage data on inflation expectations from firms partici-
pating in the Atlanta Fed’s Business Inflation Expectations Survey (BIE) and households
participating in the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE). Our analy-
sis focuses on September 2014, July 2015, and April 2019, the three time periods in which
the BIE elicited participating firms’ expectations about CPI inflation. Since the BIE only
includes firms from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee,
15We could not conduct such a reweighting exercise for German households as we did not have access
to micro data on households from New Zealand. However, census data reveal that the main difference in
the demographic composition of our sample to the population in New Zealand is a higher average age (46
vs. 38). Older respondents have somewhat less biased inflation expectations in our data. Therefore, if any-
thing, reweighting our household sample would likely somewhat further increase the gap in expectations
between households and firms.
16We find similar patterns of higher deviations from professional forecasts for policy rate expectations in
the anchor condition (p < 0.05) and for unemployment expectations (p < 0.1) after the reweighting. We
find no significant effect of reweighting on policy rate expectations in the no anchor condition.
16
we also restrict our sample of households from the SCE to respondents from those states.
Figure 3 and Table A.6 show strikingly similar patterns in the US samples as in our
German samples. In particular, firms have substantially less dispersed and lower 12-
month ahead inflation expectations compared to households.17 Specifically, pooled over
the three waves, the interquartile range of firms’ expectations is 1 percentage point, while
it is 5 percentage points for households. Moreover, the average absolute deviation of
firms’ expectations from expert forecasts taken from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) is 1.5 percentage points, while it is 4.2 percentage points
for households.
For Italy, we leverage quarterly data on inflation expectations from firms participating
in the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Inflation and Growth Expectations, and compare them
to households’ expectations measured in a special survey conducted by YouGov for the
investment firm M&G during the years 2013-2015.18
Figure 4 and Table A.7 highlight that the inflation expectations of firms are much less
dispersed (interquartile range of 1.3 vs. 2.8 percentage points) and closer to expert fore-
casts from Consensus Economics compared to households’ (mean absolute bias of 0.7
vs. 3.3 percentage points). The figure highlights that the patterns of large differences in
expectations between firms and households are very stable over the whole time period
between 2013 and 2015. Taken together, these findings underscore the robustness of our
findings from the German setting in other large industrialized countries.
3 Learning from Expert Forecasts
Besides shaping the level of dispersion and deviation from expert benchmarks in expec-
tations, the degree of information frictions should be reflected in the strength of agents’
17Results are virtually identical when using sampling weights.
18In the Bank of Italy firm survey, a random subset of firms received information about the current re-
alization of inflation, which is exploited by Coibion et al. (2020b) to study the causal effect of inflation
expectations on firm decisions. We focus on the subsample of firms that did not receive the anchor about
the current inflation rate to make the evidence comparable to the household sample.
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priors about macroeconomic variables. In this Section, we shed light on the strength of
priors by studying the degree of learning from expert forecasts about future policy using
data from our December 2019 surveys of German households and firms.19
3.1 Samples of December 2019 Surveys
Firms In December 2019, we conducted another survey containing an information treat-
ment among German firms. Given the more extensive set of questions compared to our
September 2020 survey, this survey could not be included in the monthly IBS due to space
constraints. To circumvent this constraint, we conducted a special survey on the sample
of firms regularly participating in the ifo Investment Survey (IIS), a semi-annual survey
of the German manufacturing sector, run by the ifo Institute since 1955 (see Sauer and
Wohlrabe, 2020, for details).20 Like the IBS, the IIS micro data have been used in recent
research in economics (Bachmann and Zorn, 2020; Bachmann et al., 2017).
Similar to the regular IIS, the special survey was conducted as a paper and pencil sur-
vey, which was mailed to firms and filled in and returned by the respondents. Although
this was the first time ever a special survey was conducted among the participants of the
IIS, a total of 471 firms completed the survey.21 Like the regular IBS survey, the special sur-
vey was predominantly answered by firm employees that are responsible for high-stake
economic decisions.22 We merge the data from the special survey with average levels
of investment, number of employees, and revenues the firms reported in the regular IIS
19Cavallo et al. (2017) conduct information provision experiments in the US and Argentina to show that
households hold stronger priors about inflation in the environment of high and volatile inflation in Ar-
gentina, consistent with lower information frictions.
20The IIS covers a large share of investment activity in Germany. In total, the sum of investment expen-
ditures covered by the firms in the IIS corresponds to roughly 40 percent of the total volume of investment
expenditures in the German manufacturing (plus mining) sector (Bachmann et al., 2017).
21This corresponds to a response rate of 20.3% which is largely comparable to response rates in first waves
of other firm surveys, e.g., Coibion et al. (2018b). The pool of firms that completed our special survey does
not differ significantly from the entire sample of the IIS with respect to averages in total investment, number
of employees, and revenues.
22Approximately 60 percent of all respondents stated in the survey that they personally have “very
much influence” on investment or personell decisions (recruitment and dimissals), while another 24 percent
stated to have “much influence”.
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during the three years prior to the special survey. Panel B of Table A.2 in the Online Ap-
pendix shows summary statistics for our sample of firms. The median firm employs 152
workers, has annual revenues of approximately e28 million, and has annual investments
of e820,000. While firms are on average slightly larger compared to manufacturing firms
in our September 2020 survey, the firm size distribution does not differ strongly between
the two samples.
Households We collect a sample of 4,072 employed respondents (both self-employed
and individuals in paid employment, both full-time and part-time) with the same online
panel provider as in the September 2020 survey. We drop respondents in the top and
bottom percent of response time to the survey, as these respondents were likely inatten-
tive to the survey. This leaves us with a sample of 3,992 observations. The main survey
was conducted in December 2019 and a follow-up survey in January 2020, which was
started by 2,615 of the individuals in our final sample of the main survey, among which
2,394 completed it. For each outcome variable elicited in the follow-up, we focus on the
largest available set of respondents. Panel B of Table A.3 shows summary statistics of our
household sample and a comparison to benchmarks from the 2017 wave of the German
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). Our sample is roughly representative of the employed
German population in terms of gender, age, region, and household income. As in the
September 2020 wave, our respondents are more educated on average than the general
population, as is common in online surveys.
3.2 Design of and Information Treatment in December 2019 Surveys
3.2.1 Firms
Anchoring on Current Interest Rate While in our September 2020 surveys we examine
how information about the current policy rate affects expectations, in our December 2019
surveys we study how expert forecasts about future policy rates affect expectations. Our
interest lies in understanding whether — conditional on knowledge of current realiza-
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tions — firms hold stronger priors about future realizations of macroeconomic variables
than households. We therefore inform all respondents that the current ECB policy rate lies
at zero percent before all questions eliciting prior beliefs about future interest rates, and
before all information treatments on future interest rates. Online Appendix F.1 shows the
exact instructions of the firm survey from December 2019.
Information Treatment The firm survey starts with our information treatment on future
interest rates. Our respondents are randomly assigned either into the “Increase 2020”
arm or into the “Increase 2025” arm, which both provide the respondents with a truthful
expert forecast about the point in time the ECB interest rate will increase back to a higher
level. Respondents in the “Increase 2020” group are told that according to an expert who
regularly participates in an expert survey of the ECB, the key interest rate of the ECB will
rise to a higher level in the third quarter of 2020. This information is based on the forecast
of a participant in the fourth quarter of 2019 wave of the ECB Survey of Professional
Forecasters. Respondents in the “Increase 2025” group are told that according to an expert
from a large German bank, the key interest rate of the ECB will rise to a higher level at
the earliest in 2025.23,24
Thus, respondents in the two arms of the experiment receive information treatments
that differ in the timing the expert attaches to an interest rate hike.25 Our design therefore
features an active control group, which has several advantages relative to designs that
provide a random subset of respondents with information and another subset (a passive
control group) with no information. Most relevant for our setting, identification in alter-
native designs hinges on the prior beliefs, which determine the expected direction and
strength of the information treatment. We could not elicit prior beliefs, as the firm survey
23Information on this prediction can be found under: https://www.diepresse.com/5702921/
deutscher-volkswirt-erwartet-positive-zinsen-fruhestens-ab-2025.
24Columns 5 and 6 of Table A.2 Panel B in the Online Appendix show that our firm sample is balanced
across these two arms according to some key covariates.
25One concern could be that respondents perceive the forecasts from different sources as differentially
credible or trustworthy. However, in unreported regressions, we found no significant differences across
treatment arms in the weight respondents to the household survey put on their prior beliefs when reporting
their posterior beliefs about interest rates.
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was administered in paper and pencil rather than as an online survey and we hence had
no control over the order in which respondents received the information and responded
to the different questions. In addition, prior beliefs may be measured with error, which
could attenuate estimated treatment effects. Moreover, heterogeneous treatment effects
across groups are more straightforward to interpret in our active control group design
(Haaland et al., 2020).
Post-treatment Beliefs Subsequently, we measure the respondents’ expectations about
inflation over the year 2020 and over the year 2022, as well as the unemployment rate in
2020 and in 2022. As for policy rates, the question wording includes information about the
current values of these rates, in order to hold constant beliefs about current realizations
across firms and households. We also measure detailed credit market perceptions. We
first ask the managers how difficult they think it is for similar firms to take out a loan
(i) currently, and (ii) in 2022 using five-digit response scales ranging from “very difficult”
to “very easy”. Thereafter, we measure the managers’ beliefs about the interest rates that
companies with similar characteristics as their own firm would have to pay to take out
a loan to finance investment (i) today and (ii) in 2022.26 We also measure the managers’
expectations about firm-level outcomes such as product demand or employee wages.
To study whether the information provision successfully shifts the managers’ interest
rate expectations, we also elicit their beliefs about the year of a rate hike and the level
of the policy rate in 2022 and in 2025. Finally, we measure respondents’ confidence in
these predictions about the policy rate using a four-digit categorical scale, ranging from
“very certain” to “very uncertain”. Moreover, we ask the respondents how often they
have heard news about the policy rate of the ECB over the last two weeks.
26We do not ask about the interest rates their own firm would have to pay because the managers may
find such questions intrusive, which may adversely affect the response rate to our and future surveys.
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3.2.2 Households
Prior Beliefs and Information Treatment We use the same instructions as in the firm
survey whenever possible, although there are some differences. In the household survey,
which was conducted as an online survey, we included questions on prior beliefs about
the timing of a rate hike and policy rates in 2022 and 2025 before the information provi-
sion. The information treatment is identical to the one used in the firm survey.27 Online
Appendix F.2 shows the exact instructions of the household survey from December 2019.
Post-treatment Beliefs After the information provision and after eliciting expectations
about inflation and unemployment using identical questions as in the firm survey, we
measure households’ perceptions about their own credit access, separately for consumer
credit and mortgages. We also elicit households’ beliefs about own borrowing rates and
credit access now and in 2022, as well as the interest rate they expect to receive on their
savings account. We then elicit the respondents’ posterior expectations about policy rates
and measure news acquisition about the ECB policy rate using the same questions as in
the firm survey. Moreover, we elicit the respondents’ expectations about their own labor
market outcomes.
Follow-up To examine the persistence of treatment effects and to mitigate concerns
about numerical anchoring, we conducted a follow-up survey about four weeks after
the initial survey, in which no additional treatment information is provided and in which
people are not reminded of the initial information. In the follow-up survey, we re-elicit
some of the key outcome questions from the main survey, such as expectations about fu-
ture policy rates and own interest rates. Online Appendix F.3 shows the exact instructions
of the follow-up survey.
27Columns 6 and 7 of Table A.3 Panel B in the Online Appendix show that our household sample is
mostly balanced across these two arms according to some key covariates. The expected year of a rate hike
is 0.2 years higher in the “Increase 2025” arm. This difference is statistically significant but economically
small. To address any concerns, we include a set of control variables in all our estimations.
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3.2.3 Coding of Outcome Variables
As in the September 2020 wave, we deal with outliers by trimming all quantitative point
forecasts at thresholds that are common across firms and households. We again choose
the thresholds such that the two to four percent most extreme answers in the households
sample are set to missing. This results in thresholds of 2030 for the year of a rate hike, of
-1 and 5 percent for policy rates, of 0 and 5 percent for inflation, of 15 percent for unem-
ployment, of 0 and 15 percent for own interest rates, and of -20 and 40 percent for income
growth.28 When point beliefs are included as control variables, they are winsorized to
keep the sample as large as possible. None of our findings are sensitive to the exact
trimming or winsorization procedures used.29 We z-score outcome variables elicited on
categorical response scales using the means and standard deviations in our samples.
3.3 Effects on Expectations about Policy Rates
We next examine the extent to which households and firms update their expectations
about policy rates in response to the expert forecast. We estimate the following specifica-
tion separately in the household and in the firm sample:
posteriori = α0 + α1 1(Increase 2020i) + ΠXi + εi (1)
where posteriori are post-treatment beliefs on the trajectory of the ECB policy rate.
1(Increase 2020i) is a dummy variable taking value one for respondents who received
the “Increase 2020” treatment, while it takes value zero for respondents who received
the “Increase 2025” treatment. Xi is a vector of control variables, which we include to
increase statistical power for estimating treatment effects and to address concerns related
28The thresholds for policy rates, inflation, and unemployment are lower than in the September 2020
wave because respondents were anchored on current realizations of these rates in the December 2019 sur-
vey.
29See Appendix Table A.12 for versions of our main results on the household and firm samples, respec-
tively, where outcome variables are winsorized and not trimmed.
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to imbalances according to observables.30
Panel A of Table 4 shows that households who receive the “Increase 2020” treatment
think that a rate increase will happen 1.6 years earlier compared to respondents in the
“Increase 2025” arm (Column 1, p < 0.01). Moreover, households in the “Increase 2020”
treatment think that the ECB policy rate will be 0.29 percentage points higher in 2022
(Column 2, p < 0.01) and 0.27 percentage points higher in 2025 (Column 3, p < 0.01).
Taken together, this highlights that households’ expectations about the ECB policy rate
are quite responsive to the provision of expert forecasts, consistent with households hav-
ing relatively weak priors about the ECB policy rate. Panel C of Table A.8 in the Online
Appendix shows that these effects persist in a four-week follow-up. The effect sizes in
the follow-up correspond to about one third of the initial effect sizes, in line with typical
estimates of persistence in the literature (Haaland et al., 2020). Moreover, Table A.9 in
the Online Appendix shows that respondents also significantly adjust their expectations
about real policy rates, as well as the probabilities they assign to a rate hike until 2022.
Finally, households who are more confident in their prior beliefs respond less to the fore-
casts, consistent with Bayesian updating (see Panels A, C, and E of Figure 5). At the same
time, there are no systematic differences in updating of beliefs about policy rates across
groups with different levels of financial assets, income, debt, or numeracy (see Table A.10
in the Online Appendix).
In contrast, Panel B of Table 4 highlights that firms are substantially less responsive
to the expert forecasts. While firms change their expectations about the timing of the
30Specifically, for households we control for respondents’ prior beliefs about policy rates in 2022 and
2025 and about the year of a rate hike, and confidence in these beliefs, perceptions of the respondents’
current access to and rates faced on mortgages, consumer loans and savings accounts, gender, age and age
squared, dummies for educational attainment of middle school, high school and university, dummies for
being in part-time paid employment and for being self-employed, polynomials of household income and
net wealth, homeownership, stockownership, household size, living in East Germany, a score based on
answers on three numeracy questions, risk aversion, patience, being the financially knowledgeable person
or main earner in the household, and perceptions of exposure to macroeconomic risk and to recessions. The
regressions on the firm sample control for firms’ perceptions of the respondents’ access to and rates faced
on loans, location in East Germany, and firms’ total investment, number of employees, and revenues (all in
logs) stated in the regular IIS. All our results are robust to the exclusion of control variables, see Table A.13
in the Online Appendix.
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next rate increase by about half a year (Column 1, p < 0.05), they do not significantly
adjust their expectations about the policy rate in 2022 and 2025 (Columns 2 and 3). This is
consistent with firms having stronger prior beliefs about the ECB policy rate compared to
households. The treatment effects on policy rate expectations differ significantly between
firms and households (p < 0.01 for expectations about the year of a rate hike and policy
rates in 2022 and 2025). Taken together, our fourth main finding can be summarized as
follows:
Result 4. Firms update their policy rate expectations less in response to expert forecasts compared
to households. This is consistent with firms holding stronger prior beliefs and being more well-
informed than households.
Simple belief updating experiments of this type could be subject to concerns related
to numerical anchoring and experimenter demand effects (de Quidt et al., 2018). Our ev-
idence is less prone to numerical anchoring and demand effects for three reasons: First,
policy rate expectations are elicited on a different scale than the scale on which the infor-
mation is communicated (year of increase). Second, the persistence results for the house-
hold sample suggests that at least part of our effects operate through genuine learning
rather than numerical anchoring or demand effects (Haaland et al., 2020). Third, our
finding on heterogeneous updating by confidence in the prior in the household sample
would only be consistent with demand effects that vary systematically with confidence
in the prior.
Mechanisms Sticky information models posit that information frictions arise from in-
frequent updating of information sets by economic agents. We test whether the frequency
of updating differs between firms and households leveraging unique data on information
acquisition elicited in our surveys. Specifically, we ask the respondents how often they
have heard news about the ECB policy rate over the two weeks before the survey. Fig-
ure A.8 in the Online Appendix shows the distribution of responses to this survey ques-
tion among households and firms. More than 80 percent of firms heard news about the
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ECB policy rate over the two weeks before the survey at least once, while only 56 per-
cent of households did. Similarly, while among firms more than 60 percent heard news
about the ECB policy rate at least twice over the preceding two weeks, only 33 percent of
households did.
In Panels B, D, and F of Figure 5, we examine how learning from the expert forecast
in the household sample varies with prior news consumption about the ECB policy rate.
Consistent with the idea that information frictions arise from infrequent news consump-
tion, learning rates about the year of a rate hike and policy rates in 2022 and 2025 decrease
in the level of prior news consumption. Similarly, effects on the expected year of a rate
hike in the firm sample are driven by those who report less prior news consumption, al-
though this difference is insignificant in the smaller firm sample (see Figure 6). Moreover,
the information significantly changes the expected policy rate in 2022 among firms that
report lower news consumption.
Another potential driver of differences in learning rates between firms and house-
holds could be differential trust in economic forecasts of experts. To shed light on this
mechanism, we leverage data on respondents’ trust in expert forecasts from our Septem-
ber 2020 survey. Figure A.9 in the Online Appendix shows that firms have somewhat
lower levels of trust in the economics forecasts of experts compared to households. Thus,
it is conceivable that differences in trust could explain some of the differences in learning
rates between firms and households.
3.4 Effects on Expectations about Own Interest Rates
Do firms and households think that changes in policy rates will pass through to their own
rates and credit access? Columns 4 through 6 of Panel A of Table 4 display estimated ef-
fects of the information treatment on interest rates households expect to pay if they were
to take out a loan and the rate they expect to earn on savings accounts. Respondents who
receive the “Increase 2020” treatment expect a 0.18 percentage point higher mortgage rate
in 2022 (p < 0.01), a 0.15 percentage points higher rate on consumer loans (p < 0.01) and
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a 0.13 percentage points higher rate on savings accounts (p < 0.01) compared to individu-
als in the “Increase 2025” arm.31 Respondents who receive the “Increase 2020” treatment
also report a 0.043 standard deviation lower expected access to mortgages (Column 7,
p < 0.05) and a 0.046 standard deviation lower expected access to consumer loans (Col-
umn 8, p < 0.05). Panel C of Table A.8 in the Online Appendix shows that changes in
expected personal rates persist in the four-week follow-up, again alleviating concerns re-
lated to experimenter demand effects and numerical anchoring. As shown in Table A.10
in the Online Appendix, updating of expectations about personal borrowing rates is sig-
nificantly higher for individuals with higher numeracy, and zero for those with low nu-
meracy. This is consistent with cognitive constraints shaping people’s understanding of
the transmission of policy rates to personal interest rates (D’Acunto et al., 2019a). There
are no systematic patterns of heterogeneity according to levels of household financial as-
sets, income, or debt. Taken together, our evidence highlights that households expect that
changes in policy rates will pass through to the rates they themselves face for borrowing
and saving.
In contrast, Columns 4 and 5 of Panel B of Table 4 show that the information treat-
ment has no significant effects on firms’ expected rates and credit access. This could be
due to i) the weaker first stage effect on policy rate expectations or ii) a lower elasticity of
expectations about own rates to expectations about policy rates among firms. Table A.11
in the Online Appendix displays IV estimates of the effect of the expected year of a policy
rate hike on other expectations, which scale the estimated treatment effects by the first
stage effects on the expected year of a rate hike. The coefficient estimates for effects on
own loan rates and credit access have opposite signs compared to households, suggesting
that firms may perceive a differential elasticity of own rates to policy rates than house-
holds. Given the weak first stage in the firm sample, these results should be interpreted
cautiously.
Overall, the lack of an effect on firms’ expectations is again in line with firms hold-
31These findings are reflected in significant updating of real own interest rates, which adjust for the
respondent’s inflation expectations, as can be seen in Table A.9 in the Online Appendix.
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ing stronger priors than households about policy rates and own credit market outcomes.
Taken together, our fifth main finding is the following:
Result 5. Households significantly extrapolate from changes in beliefs about the timing of a policy
rate hike to expectations about their own interest rates, while firms do not adjust their expectations
about own rates.
In Online Appendix D, we provide additional evidence on the role of expectations
about future interest rates in shaping respondents’ expectations about the broader econ-
omy and their own situation. The policy rate forecasts overall have no strong effects on
expectations about aggregate unemployment or inflation or on households’ and firms’
expected own income and business situation.
4 Conclusion and Implications
Leveraging micro data from Germany, the US, and Italy, we document five stylized facts
about the extent of information frictions among firms and households. First, firms’ ex-
pectations about the central bank policy rate, inflation, and aggregate unemployment are
more aligned with expert forecasts and less dispersed than households’. Second, differ-
ences in information about current realizations of macroeconomic variables may explain
up to 50% of the differences in expectations between firms and households. Third, there
seems to be substantially less heterogeneity in information frictions within firms than
within households. Fourth, firms update their policy rate expectations significantly less
than households when provided with an expert forecast about future rates, and those dif-
ferences are in line with higher news consumption among firms prior to the survey. Fifth,
while households significantly change their expectations about their personal saving and
borrowing rates and their access to credit in response to the expert forecast, firms do not
adjust their expectations about borrowing rates or credit access.
Our finding of higher information frictions among households than among firms has
important implications for the transmission of macroeconomic shocks and policies. For
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instance, lower information frictions should result in more rapid adjustment of beliefs and
economic decisions to macroeconomic shocks among firms. Moreover, monetary policy
may be more effective in changing the economic decisions of firms, as it takes more time
until changes in policy rates become part of households’ information sets.
Our findings have important implications for macroeconomic modeling choices. First,
the differences in belief dispersion across groups of households and across groups of firms
highlight the importance of incorporating heterogeneity into macroeconomic models, es-
pecially on the household side. Second, the differences in information frictions between
firms and households indicate that abstracting from information frictions is a less rea-
sonable approximation for households than for firms. Third, our results suggest that the
practice of using professional forecasts as a proxy for beliefs of households and firms
when no direct expectations data from these groups are available is more difficult to de-
fend for households than for firms.
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Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of expectations from the German
survey of September 2020 among the sample of respondents that did not receive information
about the current ECB policy rate. The figures show expectations about the average 2022 ECB
policy rate, the average 2025 ECB policy rate, the inflation rate over the year 2022, and the av-
erage unemployment rate in 2022 separately for households and firms. The vertical red lines
indicate the median forecast of the 2022 policy rate from the October 2020 round of the ECB SPF
(0%) and the predictions of inflation and unemployment in 2022 of the “Joint Economic Forecast”
of Germany’s leading economic research institutes (1.6% and 5.5%), respectively. For the sake
of readability, we winsorize expectations at -1 and 10, 0 and 10, and 0 and 20 for policy rates,
inflation, and unemployment, respectively.
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(b) Panel B: Firms
Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of policy rate expectations from the
German survey of September 2020 separately for respondents that received information about the
current rate and those who did not receive the anchor before making their prediction. Respon-
dents were asked to predict the average policy rate in 2022 and in 2025, respectively. Panel A
presents these expectations for the household sample and Panel B for the firm sample. For the
sake of readability, we winsorize policy rate expectations at -1 and 10.
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Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of expected inflation rates over the
next 12 months from US firms participating in the Atlanta Fed’s Business Inflation Expectations
Survey (BIE) and households participating in the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expecta-
tions (SCE). Distributions are presented separately for the three months in which the BIE elicited
expectations about CPI inflation from participating firms, as well as pooling across these three
months. The sample for the SCE is restricted to respondents from Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, in line with the sampling frame of the BIE. The vertical
red lines indicate the median expert forecast taken from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters (SPF), which is 2.10, 2.04, and 2.09, respectively for the waves in September
2014, July 2015, and April 2019. For the sake of readability, we winsorize inflation expectations at
0 and 10.
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Panel B: Households (M&G Survey)
Notes: This Figure shows inflation expectations from Italian firms participating in the Bank of
Italy’s Survey on Inflation and Growth Expectations (SIGE), and households’ inflation expecta-
tions measured in a special survey conducted by YouGov for the investment firm M&G during the
years 2013-2015. The figure shows median inflation expectations, the 25th and 75th percentile of
the distribution as well as the median expert forecasts. The dashed red lines indicate professional
forecasts from Consensus Economics. Statistics for both surveys are computed using population
weights. The statistics from the firm sample are based on firms in the control group of the exper-
iment used in Coibion et al. (2020b), i.e., they are based on firms that were never provided with
inflation-related information.
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Panel F: Policy rate 2025
Notes: This Figure presents the estimated response of households’ expectations regarding the year
of policy rate increase (Panels A and B), the policy rate in 2022 (Panels C and D), and the policy
rate in 2025 (Panels E and F) to randomized information from an expert forecast predicting a
policy rate increase in 2020 relative to respondents that received an expert forecast predicting an
increase in 2025 at the earliest. All estimations are based on the German household survey from
December 2019. Panels A, C, and E present separate estimations for the different confidence in
priors reported by households and Panels B, D, and F estimate the effects separately for differ-
ent prior news consumption about the ECB policy rate. The regressions control for respondents’
prior beliefs about policy rates and confidence in these beliefs, perceptions of the respondents’
access to and rates faced on mortgages, consumer loans and savings accounts, gender, age, ed-
ucational attainment, employment status, household income and net wealth, homeownership,
stockownership, household size, living in East Germany, numeracy, risk aversion, patience, be-
ing the financially knowledgeable person or main earner in the household, and perceptions of
exposure to macroeconomic risk. Confidence bounds are depicted at the 90% level.
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Panel C: Policy rate 2025
Notes: This Figure presents the estimated response of firms’ expectations regarding the year of
policy rate increase (Panel A), the policy rate in 2022 (Panels B), and the policy rate in 2025 (Panel
C) to randomized information from an expert forecast predicting a policy rate increase in 2020
relative to respondents that received an expert forecast predicting an increase in 2025 at the ear-
liest. All estimations are based on the German firms survey from December 2019. The effects
are estimated separately for different prior news consumption about the ECB policy rate. The
regressions control for firms’ perceptions of access to and rates faced on loans, location in East
Germany, and firms’ total investment, number of employees, and revenues (all in logs) stated in
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Correlates of Firms’ Beliefs and Deviations from Experts: 2020 Survey
Policy rate 2022
Policy
rate 2025 Inflation 2022 Unempl. rate 2022











Log(Firm age) 0.005 -0.012 -0.056 -0.069 -0.033 0.007 -0.020
(0.024) (0.023) (0.053) (0.079) (0.069) (0.121) (0.105)
Log(Employees) 0.001 -0.001 -0.088∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.048) (0.041)
Export share -0.008 -0.003 0.149 -0.880∗∗∗ -0.782∗∗∗ -0.072 0.069
(0.087) (0.084) (0.203) (0.227) (0.192) (0.421) (0.363)
Negative impact of coronavirus 0.017 0.019 -0.015 0.191∗ 0.106 0.533∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.093) (0.108) (0.093) (0.152) (0.127)
Services Firm 0.069 0.004 0.132 -0.546∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗ -0.202 -0.035
(0.049) (0.047) (0.090) (0.175) (0.157) (0.185) (0.158)
Retail/Wholesale Firm -0.013 -0.061 -0.010 -0.501∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗ 0.115 0.095
(0.047) (0.045) (0.105) (0.187) (0.169) (0.206) (0.176)
Equity ratio -0.055 -0.058 -0.102 0.106 0.188 -0.252 -0.101
(0.082) (0.080) (0.138) (0.196) (0.171) (0.310) (0.268)
Cash to total assets 0.063 0.156 -0.223 0.384 0.138 0.585 0.409
(0.149) (0.144) (0.186) (0.288) (0.247) (0.569) (0.496)
Any change in loan interest rate in last 6 months -0.080∗ -0.077∗ -0.214∗∗ 0.037 0.018 -0.035 0.234
(0.046) (0.041) (0.100) (0.192) (0.164) (0.278) (0.209)
University -0.068 -0.058 0.068 -0.177 -0.219∗ -0.025 -0.032
(0.042) (0.041) (0.089) (0.130) (0.115) (0.161) (0.136)
Anchored on current policy rate -0.019 -0.070∗∗ 0.063
(0.034) (0.032) (0.079)
Observations 2317 2317 1106 1103 1103 1222 1222
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Mean dep. variable (no anchor) 0.27 0.38 0.72 2.06 0.94 . .
SD dep. variable (no anchor) 0.74 0.69 1.43 1.69 1.48 . .
Mean dep. variable (anchor) 0.26 0.31 0.78 . . 6.93 1.93
SD dep. variable (anchor) 0.86 0.84 1.10 . . 2.52 2.16
Notes: This Table examines correlates of firms’ expectations and absolute deviations of beliefs from expert
benchmarks on respondent characteristics based on the German firm survey of September 2020. Experts
benchmarks are the median forecast of the 2022 policy rate from the October 2020 round of the ECB SPF (0%)
and the predictions of inflation and unemployment in 2022 of the “Joint Economic Forecast” of Germany’s
leading economic research institutes (1.6% and 5.5%), respectively. “Negative impact of coronavirus” is
a dummy for firms that reported a negative impact of the Covid-19 crisis on their business activity in
September 2020. The dummy variables “Services firm” and “Retail/Wholesale firm” capture the effect of
firms in the respective industries relative to manufacturing firms. “Equity ratio”, “Cash to total assets”, and
“Any change in loan interest rate in last 6 months” are elicited in the September 2020 wave of the IBS, while
the latter is a dummy for firms stating that they have experienced a change to their loan interest rate over
the previous six months. “University” is a dummy for respondents with a diploma, master, or Ph.D. degree.
“Anchored on current policy rate” is a dummy that is one if respondents received information about the
current rate before making their prediction. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * denotes
significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table 3: Correlates of Households’ Beliefs and Deviations from Experts: 2020 Survey
Policy rate 2022
Policy
rate 2025 Inflation 2022 Unempl. rate 2022











Female 0.458∗ 0.442∗ 0.341 0.942∗∗ 0.962∗∗ 2.831∗∗∗ 2.801∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.266) (0.281) (0.398) (0.386) (0.627) (0.600)
Age at least 50 -1.029∗∗∗ -1.049∗∗∗ -1.031∗∗∗ -1.265∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ -2.097∗∗∗ -2.262∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.251) (0.282) (0.395) (0.384) (0.604) (0.574)
Highschool -0.095 -0.110 -0.180 -0.171 -0.142 -1.907∗∗ -1.859∗∗
(0.295) (0.294) (0.331) (0.475) (0.461) (0.759) (0.725)
University -0.314 -0.316 -0.647∗∗ -0.431 -0.410 -2.078∗∗∗ -2.087∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.261) (0.259) (0.431) (0.415) (0.674) (0.637)
Covid-19 worsens economic situation -0.051 -0.034 -0.279 0.571 0.579 2.060∗∗∗ 1.902∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.260) (0.277) (0.415) (0.402) (0.674) (0.647)
Employed -0.126 -0.095 0.030 0.811 0.759 1.155 1.281
(0.572) (0.572) (0.679) (0.931) (0.899) (1.460) (1.399)
Unemployed 1.611 1.679 0.433 1.607 1.582 1.316 2.619
(1.499) (1.488) (1.157) (2.123) (2.068) (3.393) (2.963)
Income > e 3,000 -0.052 -0.052 0.070 -0.849∗∗ -0.785∗∗ -0.744 -0.660
(0.248) (0.247) (0.291) (0.377) (0.362) (0.620) (0.585)
Financial assets > e 11,000 -0.619∗∗∗ -0.639∗∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗ -1.052∗∗ -1.094∗∗∗ -1.056 -1.031
(0.235) (0.233) (0.279) (0.433) (0.419) (0.706) (0.665)
Stockowner 0.004 0.001 0.145 -0.458 -0.389 -0.222 -0.359
(0.262) (0.261) (0.337) (0.417) (0.403) (0.755) (0.728)
Homeowner 0.535∗∗ 0.558∗∗ 0.540∗ 1.028∗∗ 0.984∗∗ 0.428 0.368
(0.267) (0.266) (0.294) (0.426) (0.415) (0.606) (0.574)
Debtor -0.097 -0.107 -0.188 0.280 0.264 0.572 0.302
(0.252) (0.250) (0.261) (0.402) (0.388) (0.613) (0.588)
High numeracy -1.384∗∗∗ -1.361∗∗∗ -1.327∗∗∗ -2.247∗∗∗ -2.232∗∗∗ -3.643∗∗∗ -3.488∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.243) (0.262) (0.377) (0.365) (0.561) (0.538)
Main earner 0.175 0.169 0.186 0.541∗ 0.536∗∗ 0.071 0.110
(0.184) (0.184) (0.194) (0.278) (0.269) (0.382) (0.360)
High recession exposure -0.383 -0.385 -0.056 -0.229 -0.253 -1.599∗∗ -1.711∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.263) (0.271) (0.391) (0.379) (0.643) (0.616)
Anchored on current policy rate -0.804∗∗∗ -0.816∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗ -0.753∗ -0.686∗ -0.255 -0.198
(0.237) (0.236) (0.252) (0.384) (0.368) (0.662) (0.630)
Observations 903 903 900 897 897 903 903
R2 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
Mean dep. variable (no anchor) 2.04 2.07 2.40 4.72 3.41 11.01 6.08
SD dep. variable (no anchor) 4.24 4.22 4.20 6.10 5.95 9.38 9.02
Mean dep. variable (anchor) 1.18 1.20 1.76 3.91 2.66 11.06 6.19
SD dep. variable (anchor) 2.93 2.92 3.54 4.71 4.52 9.32 8.91
Notes: This Table examines correlates of households’ expectations and absolute deviations of beliefs from
expert benchmarks on respondent characteristics based on the German household survey of September
2020. Experts benchmarks are the median forecast of the 2022 policy rate from the October 2020 round of the
ECB SPF (0%) and predictions of inflation and unemployment in 2022 of the “Joint Economic Forecast” of
Germany’s leading economic research institutes (1.6% and 5.5%), respectively. “Anchored on current policy
rate” is a dummy that is one if respondents received information about the current rate before making their
prediction. All other covariates are coded as dummies and explained in the main text. Robust standard
errors are displayed in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Households
Increase 2020 (A) -1.612∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.072) (0.023) (0.029) (0.040) (0.044) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 3758 3896 3828 3859 3864 3818 3992 3992
R2 0.46 0.40 0.46 0.83 0.80 0.65 0.70 0.63
Mean dep. variable 2023.32 0.63 1.22 4.05 4.63 0.62 -0.00 0.00



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B: Firms
Increase 2020 (B) -0.519∗∗ 0.035 0.018 -0.020 -0.038
(0.244) (0.057) (0.093) (0.071) (0.058)
Observations 401 430 428 436 463
R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.85 0.62
Mean dep. variable 2023.45 0.26 0.95 2.80 0.00
SD dep. variable 2.43 0.59 0.95 1.87 1.00
p-value(A=B) 0.000 0.000 0.010
Notes: This Table examines the effect of the randomized information provision on posterior expectations of
households (Panel A) and firms (Panel B) based on the German firm and household surveys of December
2019. “Increase 2020” is a dummy taking value one if the respondent received the forecast predicting a
policy rate increase in 2020, and zero if the respondent received the forecast predicting an increase in 2025
at the earliest. The outcomes in Panel A Columns 7 and 8 and Panel B Column 5 are z-scored using the
mean and the standard deviation in the corresponding sample. The regressions on the household sample
control for respondents’ prior beliefs about policy rates and confidence in these beliefs, perceptions of the
respondents’ access to and rates faced on mortgages, consumer loans and savings accounts, gender, age,
educational attainment, employment status, household income and net wealth, homeownership, stock-
ownership, household size, living in East Germany, numeracy, risk aversion, patience, being the financially
knowledgeable person or main earner in the household, and perceptions of exposure to macroeconomic
risk. The regressions on the firm sample control for firms’ perceptions of access to and rates faced on loans,
location in East Germany, and firms’ total investment, number of employees, and revenues (all in logs)
stated in the regular ifo Investment Survey. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * denotes
significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of expectations from the German survey
of September 2020 among the sample of respondents that received information about the current ECB
policy rate before making their predictions. The figures show expectations about the average 2022 ECB
policy rate and the average 2025 ECB policy rate separately for households and firms. The vertical red
line indicates the median forecast of the 2022 policy rate from the October 2020 round of the ECB SPF
(0%). For the sake of readability, we winsorize policy rate expectations at -1 and 10.
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Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of household expectations from the Ger-
man survey of September 2020 using only respondents in the “no anchor” condition. The figures show
expectations about the average 2022 ECB policy rate, the average 2025 ECB policy rate, the inflation rate
over the year 2022, and the average unemployment rate in 2022. The Figure shows the distributions sep-
arately for respondents who worry about personal health or economic consequences of the coronavirus
crisis and for those who do not. For the sake of readability, we winsorize expectations at -1 and 10, 0
and 10, and 0 and 20 for policy rates, inflation, and unemployment, respectively.
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Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of firm expectations from the German sur-
vey of September 2020 survey using only respondents in the “no anchor” condition. The figures show
expectations about the average 2022 ECB policy rate, the average 2025 ECB policy rate, the inflation rate
over the year 2022, and the average unemployment rate in 2022. The Figure shows the distributions
separately for respondents that reported a negative vs a non-negative impact of the coronavirus crisis
on their business activity. For the sake of readability, we winsorize expectations at -1 and 10, 0 and 10,
and 0 and 20 for policy rates, inflation, and unemployment, respectively.
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Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of household and firm expectations from
the German survey of September 2020 using only respondents in the “no anchor” condition. The fig-
ures show expectations about the average 2022 ECB policy rate, the average 2025 ECB policy rate, the
inflation rate over the year 2022, and the average unemployment rate in 2022. The Figure displays
these expectations separately for households with above median and below median numeracy againt
the benchmark of firms. For the sake of readability, we winsorize expectations at -1 and 10, 0 and 10,
and 0 and 20 for policy rates, inflation, and unemployment, respectively.
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Figure A.5: Heterogeneity in Household Expectations by Sophisticated vs Non-





















































































Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of household and firm expectations from
the German survey of September 2020 using only respondents in the “no anchor” condition. The fig-
ures show expectations about the average 2022 ECB policy rate, the average 2025 ECB policy rate, the
inflation rate over the year 2022, and the average unemployment rate in 2022. The Figure displays these
expectations separately for “sophisticated” households with more aligned expectations (above median
age, financial assets, and numeracy), which applies to 19 percent of households, and the remaining,
“non-sophisticated” households against the benchmark of firms. For the sake of readability, we win-
sorize expectations at -1 and 10, 0 and 10, and 0 and 20 for policy rates, inflation, and unemployment,
respectively.
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Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of household and firm expectations from
the German survey of September 2020 using only respondents in the “no anchor” condition. The figures
show expectations about the average 2022 ECB policy rate, the average 2025 ECB policy rate, the infla-
tion rate over the year 2022, and the average unemployment rate in 2022. The Figure displays these ex-
pectations separately for “non-sophisticated” firm with less aligned expectations (non-exporting firms
with below median number of employees), which applies to 18 percent of firms, and the remaining,
“sophisticated” firms against the benchmark of households. For the sake of readability, we winsorize
expectations at -1 and 10, 0 and 10, and 0 and 20 for policy rates, inflation, and unemployment, respec-
tively.
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Figure A.7: Macro Expectations among Households and Firms w/o Anchor: 2020 Survey:
























































































Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of expectations about the average 2022
ECB policy rate, the average 2025 ECB policy rate, the inflation rate over the year 2022, and the average
unemployment rate in 2022 from the German survey of September 2020 among the sample of respon-
dents that did not receive information about the current ECB policy rate. In addition to the unadjusted
samples of firms (solid lines) and households (short-dashed lines), the dashed lines present the distribu-
tions of expectations after reweighting the sample of firms to make it similar in terms of observables to
the New Zealand firms in Coibion et al. (2018b) along the following dimensions: number of employees,
export share, and industry composition as described in Appendix C. The vertical red lines indicate the
median forecast of the 2022 policy rate from the October 2020 round of the ECB SPF (0%) and the pre-
dictions of inflation and unemployment in 2022 of the “Joint Economic Forecast” of Germany’s leading
economic research institutes (1.6% and 5.5%), respectively. For readability, we winsorize expectations at
-1 and 10, 0 and 10, and 0 and 20 for policy rates, inflation, and unemployment, respectively.
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Never Once 2-3 Times 4-5 Times 5+ Times
Heard news about policy rate in last 2 weeks
Firms
Households
Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of information acquisition about the ECB
policy rate from the German survey of December 2019 in the firm and household samples. The figure
shows the responses to the question: “How often have news about the policy rate of the European
Central Bank (ECB) come to your attention in the last two weeks?”. Respondents answered on the
following scale: Never - Once - Between 2 and 3 times - Between 4 and 5 times - More than 5 times. The
Figure displays these distributions separately for households and firms.
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Notes: This Figure shows the cumulative distribution function of trust in economic forecasts of experts
as measured in the German survey of September 2020 in the firm and household samples. The figure
shows responses to the question: “How much trust do you have in the economic forecasts of experts?”
Respondents answered on a scale ranging from [1] “no trust at all” to [7] “very high trust”. The Figure
displays these distributions separately for households and firms.
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Table A.1: Overview of Different Datasets




Firms Sept. 2020 Wave
(ifo Business Survey)




Germany 961 September 2020 Info about current ECB
policy rate
Firms Dec. 2019 Wave (ifo
Investment Survey)
Germany 471 December 2019 Expert forecast about
timing of policy rate hike
Households Dec. 2019
Wave (Dynata)
Germany 3,992 December 2019 Expert forecast about
timing of policy rate hike
Other Surveys
Bank of Italy Survey on
Inflation and Growth
Expectations (SIGE)
Italy 3,295 2013-2015 None
M&G YouGov Household
survey




US 582 2014, 2015, 2019 None
NY Fed’s Survey of
Consumer Expectations
(SCE)
US 503 2014, 2015, 2019 None
Notes: This Table provides an overview of the different datasets used in this paper.
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics and Balance of Firm Surveys
Full survey sample (2020 wave)
No
anchor Anchor p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean Median SD N Mean Mean (5) = (6)
Panel A: 2020 wave
Firm age 53 38 39 2723 52.54 53.87 0.37
Employees 312.69 42.00 2239.94 3735 262.72 364.16 0.17
Export share 0.18 0.09 0.22 3744 0.17 0.18 0.11
East Germany 0.12 0.00 0.32 3748 0.12 0.12 0.94
Negative impact of coronavirus 0.69 1.00 0.46 3635 0.69 0.69 0.80
Equity ratio 0.46 0.40 0.28 2991 0.45 0.46 0.74
Cash to total assets 0.22 0.15 0.22 1942 0.22 0.21 0.31
Any change in loan interest rate in last 6 months 0.08 0.00 0.27 3078 0.07 0.08 0.39
University 0.64 1.00 0.48 3044 0.65 0.63 0.18
Manufacturing Firm 0.37 0.00 0.48 3748 0.35 0.38 0.05
Services Firm 0.38 0.00 0.48 3748 0.38 0.38 0.83
Retail/Wholesale Firm 0.26 0.00 0.44 3748 0.27 0.24 0.02





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean Median SD N Mean Mean (5)=(6)
Panel B: 2019 wave
Employees (2016-2018 mean) 815.96 151.65 6022.83 464 878.05 750.57 0.82
Revenues (2016-2018 mean; in mn.) 351.97 28.07 3643.01 464 430.10 269.69 0.64
Total Investment (2016-2018 mean; in mn.) 11.87 0.82 114.29 464 13.54 10.11 0.75
East Germany 0.30 0.00 0.46 437 0.30 0.29 0.73
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics of the German firm surveys conducted in September 2020
(Panel A) and December 2019 (Panel B). Columns 5 and 6 of Panel A display the sample means separately
for respondents that did not receive information about the current rate and those who received the anchor
before making their prediction, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 of Panel B display the sample means sepa-
rately for respondents that obtained information from an expert forecast predicting a policy rate increase
in 2020 and for respondents that received an expert forecast predicting an increase in 2025 at the earliest,
respectively. Column 7 presents the p-values of a t-test on the equality of the means depicted in Columns 5
and 6. “Negative impact of coronavirus” is a dummy for firms that reported a negative impact of the
Covid-19 crisis on their business activity in September 2020. The “Equity ratio”, the “Cash to total assets”
ratio, and “Any change in loan interest rate in last 6 months” are elicited in the September 2020 wave of the
IBS. “University” is a dummy for respondents with a diploma, master, or Ph.D. degree from the February
2020 IBS wave. Firm age and export share are calculated from responses to the September 2018 IBS wave.
The number of observations differs across variables as we merge information from different modules and
waves of the IBS. In our regressions we deal with non-response as described in Footnote 11. The variables
in Panel B refer to average levels of the number of employees, revenues, and total investment the firms re-
ported in the regular ifo Investment Survey during the three years prior to the special survey in December
2019.
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics and Balance of Household Surveys
GSOEP:
Full Full survey sample (2020 wave)
No
anchor Anchor p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Mean Median SD N Mean Mean (6) = (7)
Panel A: 2020 wave
Female 0.51 0.46 0.00 0.50 933 0.46 0.45 0.783
Age 51.81 45.70 50.00 13.53 933 45.25 46.14 0.315
East 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.40 933 0.19 0.22 0.207
Log(HH net income) 7.85 7.90 8.01 0.61 933 7.89 7.90 0.782
At least highschool 0.32 0.59 1.00 0.49 933 0.60 0.59 0.834
Log(HH financial assets + 1) 7.56 9.17 4.16 933 7.72 7.40 0.237
Stockowner 0.34 0.00 0.47 930 0.35 0.34 0.850
Homeowner 0.44 0.00 0.50 933 0.46 0.42 0.146
Debtor 0.37 0.00 0.48 933 0.38 0.35 0.432
GSOEP:





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Mean Median SD N Mean Mean (6)=(7)
Panel B: 2019 wave
Female 0.45 0.47 0.00 0.50 3992 0.47 0.47 0.746
Age 45.67 46.18 50.00 11.84 3992 46.33 46.03 0.426
East 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.39 3992 0.17 0.21 0.004
Log(HH net income) 8.04 7.96 8.01 0.58 3992 7.96 7.97 0.512
At least highschool 0.40 0.58 1.00 0.49 3992 0.58 0.58 0.804
Log(HH financial assets + 1) 7.78 9.31 4.15 3992 7.68 7.88 0.132
Stockowner 0.38 0.00 0.49 3992 0.37 0.39 0.113
Homeowner 0.49 0.00 0.50 3992 0.50 0.49 0.945
Debtor 0.42 0.00 0.49 3992 0.42 0.42 0.969
Prior policy rate 2022 0.57 0.10 0.95 3880 0.58 0.55 0.313
Prior policy rate 2025 1.14 1.00 1.22 3796 1.13 1.14 0.928
Prior year policy rate increase 2023.41 2022.00 3.07 3686 2023.31 2023.51 0.042
Prior confidence policy rates (z) 0.00 -0.13 1.00 3992 -0.01 0.01 0.666
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics of the German household surveys conducted in September
2020 (Panel A) and December 2019 (Panel B). For comparison, Column 1 depicts benchmarks from the
2017 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a representative household survey in Germany.
Columns 6 and 7 of Panel A display the sample means separately for respondents that did not receive
information about the current rate and those who received the anchor before making their prediction, re-
spectively. Columns 6 and 7 of Panel B display the sample means separately for respondents that obtained
information from an expert forecast predicting a policy rate increase in 2020 and for respondents that re-
ceived an expert forecast predicting an increase in 2025 at the earliest, respectively. Column 8 presents the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.5: Correlates of Households’ Prior Beliefs about Policy Rates: 2019 Survey
Prior beliefs Information acquisition






















Female 0.154 0.054 0.041 -0.413∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.034) (0.044) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033)
Age at least 50 0.107 -0.030 0.032 -0.023 0.075∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.032) (0.041) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Highschool 0.166 -0.095∗∗ -0.096∗ 0.047 0.043 0.036
(0.127) (0.038) (0.050) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
University 0.106 -0.067∗ -0.071 0.034 0.108∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.127) (0.036) (0.048) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Part-time employed (paid) -0.077 0.021 0.042 -0.142∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.022
(0.137) (0.046) (0.057) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Self-employed 0.275 -0.053 0.010 0.068 0.144∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.051) (0.072) (0.058) (0.059) (0.062)
Income > e 3,000 -0.152 -0.044 -0.031 0.016 -0.027 -0.022
(0.117) (0.032) (0.043) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Financial assets > e 11,000 0.300∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.034) (0.045) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Stockowner 0.064 -0.069∗∗ -0.106∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.032) (0.044) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
Homeowner 0.071 -0.047 -0.047 0.110∗∗∗ 0.037 0.065∗∗
(0.108) (0.031) (0.041) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Debtor -0.108 0.073∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.074∗∗ -0.002
(0.104) (0.031) (0.041) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
High numeracy 0.646∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.109) (0.030) (0.041) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Main earner -0.108 0.057∗∗ 0.033 -0.037∗ 0.015 0.014
(0.068) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
High recession exposure 0.184∗ -0.051∗ -0.053 0.092∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.030) (0.040) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 3686 3880 3796 3992 3992 3992
R2 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.12
Mean dep. variable 2023.41 0.57 1.14 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
SD dep. variable 3.07 0.95 1.22 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: This Table examines correlates of households’ prior beliefs and measures on information acquisition
based on the German household survey from December 2019. The dependent variables are the prior beliefs
on the expected year of a policy rate increase and the policy rate in 2022 and 2025, households’ confidence
in their priors about policy rates, and the frequency of news received on interest rates and the ECB in the
two weeks prior to the survey, respectively. The outcomes in Columns 4 through 6 are z-scored using the
mean and the standard deviation in the corresponding sample. All covariates are coded as dummies and
explained in the main text. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * denotes significance at


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Main
Increase 2020 -1.612∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.072) (0.023) (0.029) (0.040) (0.044) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 3758 3896 3828 3859 3864 3818 3992 3992
R2 0.46 0.40 0.46 0.83 0.80 0.65 0.70 0.63
Panel B: Main
follow-up sample
Increase 2020 -1.493∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ -0.037∗ -0.041∗
(0.086) (0.027) (0.035) (0.048) (0.053) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
Observations 2397 2522 2475 2451 2446 2394 2568 2568
R2 0.48 0.40 0.47 0.83 0.80 0.65 0.73 0.65
Panel C: Follow-up
Increase 2020 -0.465∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.042 0.232∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.071∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.071∗∗
(0.100) (0.029) (0.038) (0.088) (0.100) (0.034) (0.031) (0.032)
Observations 2397 2522 2475 2451 2446 2394 2568 2568
R2 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.38 0.37
Notes: This Table examines the effect of the randomized information provision on posterior expectations of
German households provided in the December 2019 survey. “Increase 2020” is a dummy taking value one
if the respondent received the forecast predicting a policy rate increase in 2020, and zero if the respondent
received the forecast predicting an increase in 2025 at the earliest. Panel A corresponds to Panel A of
Table 4 and displays the immediate effect in the December 2019 survey. Panel C reports the effects of the
information treatment in a four-week follow up in January 2020. Panel B presents the results based on the
main survey in December 2019 for those households that are also in the sample of Panel C. The outcomes
in Columns 7 and 8 are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation in the corresponding sample.
In all regressions we control for the same variables as in Panel A of Table 4. Robust standard errors are
displayed in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A.9: Effect of Provision of Expert Forecasts on Other Credit Market Expectations:

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Households main
Increase 2020 (A) 0.251∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 13.881∗∗∗ 0.106
(0.031) (0.043) (0.047) (0.030) (0.994) (0.656)
Observations 3838 3794 3797 3769 3992 3992
R2 0.19 0.80 0.77 0.40 0.19 0.07
Panel B: Households main
follow-up sample
Increase 2020 0.220∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.059 0.103∗∗∗ 14.524∗∗∗ 0.038
(0.037) (0.050) (0.058) (0.034) (1.226) (0.822)
Observations 2267 2251 2247 2205 2596 2596
R2 0.21 0.82 0.78 0.41 0.20 0.07
Panel C: Households follow-up
Increase 2020 0.028 0.123 0.148 0.040 5.862∗∗∗ -1.968∗∗
(0.050) (0.090) (0.105) (0.054) (1.302) (0.859)
Observations 2267 2251 2247 2205 2596 2596
















Notes: This Table examines the effect of the randomized information provision on posterior expectations
of German households reported in the December 2019 survey about real policy rates, own real rates, and
the probabilities respondents assign to a rate increase or decrease until 2022. “Increase 2020” is a dummy
taking value one if the respondent received the forecast predicting a policy rate increase in 2020, and zero
if the respondent received the forecast predicting an increase in 2025 at the earliest. Expectations about
real rates are obtained by deflating expected nominal rates by the respondents’ expected inflation rate for
2022. Panel A displays the immediate effect in the December 2019 household survey. Panel C reports the
effects of the information treatment in a four-week follow up in January 2020. Panel B presents the results
based on the main survey in December 2019 for those households that are also in the sample of Panel C.
Panel D depicts the results for the firm survey from December 2019. In all regressions we control for the
same variables as in Table 4. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * denotes significance at
10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. 18






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Increase 2020 (a) -1.735∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.081 0.001 0.109∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.030
(0.141) (0.050) (0.062) (0.081) (0.088) (0.041) (0.030) (0.035)
Increase 2020 × 0.061 -0.025 0.045 0.157∗ 0.133 0.017 -0.022 -0.018
Fin. assets > e 11,000 (b) (0.153) (0.050) (0.063) (0.088) (0.096) (0.043) (0.038) (0.044)
Increase 2020 × 0.265∗ 0.032 0.043 0.043 0.066 0.050 -0.016 0.034
Debtor (c) (0.145) (0.046) (0.060) (0.082) (0.092) (0.041) (0.036) (0.041)
Increase 2020 × 0.229 -0.001 -0.008 -0.114 -0.152 -0.021 0.012 -0.001
Income > e 3,000 (d) (0.153) (0.048) (0.062) (0.084) (0.096) (0.042) (0.039) (0.043)
Increase 2020 × -0.217 0.056 0.014 0.094 0.218∗∗ -0.004 -0.040 -0.044
High numeracy (e) (0.146) (0.046) (0.058) (0.084) (0.091) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
p-value(a+b=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.171 0.006 0.417 0.296
p-value(a+c=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.189 0.513 0.000 0.493 0.913
p-value(a+d=0) 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.749 0.211 0.098 0.974 0.541
p-value(a+e=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.026 0.020 0.189 0.084
Observations 3758 3896 3828 3859 3864 3818 3992 3992
R2 0.46 0.41 0.46 0.83 0.80 0.65 0.70 0.63
Notes: This Table extends the analysis of Panel A of Table 4 for different group of German households in
the December 2019 survey. “Increase 2020” is a dummy taking value one if the respondent received the
forecast predicting a policy rate increase in 2020, and zero if the respondent received the forecast predicting
an increase in 2025 at the earliest. “Increase 2020” is interacted with dummies that take value one for
high levels of financial assets, debt, income, or numeracy. The outcomes in Columns 7 and 8 are z-scored
using the mean and the standard deviation in the corresponding sample. The p-values testing whether
treatment effects for different groups are different from zero are displayed at the bottom of the Table. In
all regressions we control for the same variables as in Table 4. Robust standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Households
Year policy rate increase (A) -0.182∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.025) (0.028) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 3680 3630 3644 3652 3608 3758 3758
R2 0.37 0.46 0.84 0.81 0.64 0.70 0.62
Mean dep. variable 0.65 1.27 4.04 4.63 0.64 0.01 0.02
SD dep. variable 0.92 1.21 3.01 3.07 1.03 0.99 0.99















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Firms
Year policy rate increase (B) -0.141 -0.090 0.022 -0.011
(0.102) (0.174) (0.155) (0.118)
Observations 387 387 381 399
R2 0.24 0.21 0.85 0.64
Mean dep. variable 0.28 0.99 2.81 0.01
SD dep. variable 0.60 0.94 1.90 1.01
First stage F-stat 4.44 4.08 3.83 4.33
p-value(A=B) 0.688 0.661
Notes: This Table examines the effect of the expected year of a policy rate hike on other expectations of
German households (Panel A) and firms (Panel B). The expected year of a rate hike is instrumented with
the “Increase 2020” dummy, which takes value one if the respondent received the forecast predicting a
policy rate increase in 2020, and zero if the respondent received the forecast predicting an increase in 2025
at the earliest. The outcomes in Panel A Columns 6 and 7 and Panel B Column 4 are z-scored using the
mean and the standard deviation in the corresponding sample. In all regressions we control for the same
variables as in Table 4. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10
pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A.12: Learning from Experts’ Policy Rate Forecasts: Robustness to Trimming





























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Households trimmed (baseline)
Increase 2020 -1.612∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.072) (0.023) (0.029) (0.040) (0.044) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 3758 3896 3828 3859 3864 3818 3992 3992
R2 0.46 0.40 0.46 0.83 0.80 0.65 0.70 0.63
Panel B: Households winsorized
Increase 2020 -1.523∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.072) (0.025) (0.031) (0.044) (0.047) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 3992 3992 3992 3992 3992 3992 3992 3992



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel C: Firms trimmed (baseline)
Increase 2020 -0.519∗∗ 0.035 0.018 -0.020 -0.038
(0.244) (0.057) (0.093) (0.071) (0.058)
Observations 401 430 428 436 463
R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.85 0.62
Panel D: Firms winsorized
Increase 2020 -0.437∗ -0.011 -0.046 -0.160 -0.038
(0.264) (0.120) (0.127) (0.143) (0.058)
Observations 416 466 466 466 463
R2 0.03 0.13 0.10 0.82 0.62
Notes: This Table provides a robustness check of the results presented in Table 4. Panels A and C correspond
to the baseline estimations of Table 4 that trim the data at thresholds of 2030 for the year of a rate hike, of
-1 and 5 percent for policy rates, of 0 and 5 percent for inflation, of 15 percent for unemployment, of 0 and
15 percent for own interest rates, and of -20 and 40 percent for income growth. Panels B and D present
results when winsorizing the data at the same thresholds. For variable descriptions and information on
control variables refer to the note in Table 4. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * denotes
significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A.13: Learning from Experts’ Policy Rate Forecasts: Robustness to Omission of





























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Households
Increase 2020 (A) -1.694∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗ 0.073 0.150∗∗∗ -0.061∗ -0.054∗
(0.092) (0.029) (0.039) (0.098) (0.099) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 3758 3896 3828 3859 3864 3818 3992 3992
R2 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Mean dep. variable 2023.32 0.63 1.22 4.05 4.63 0.62 -0.00 0.00



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B: Firms
Increase 2020 (B) -0.513∗∗ 0.032 0.018 -0.039 0.036
(0.241) (0.057) (0.092) (0.180) (0.093)
Observations 403 432 430 437 463
R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean dep. variable 2023.44 0.26 0.95 2.80 0.00
SD dep. variable 2.43 0.59 0.95 1.87 1.00
p-value(A=B) 0.000 0.000 0.012
Notes: This Table examines the effect of the randomized information provision on posterior expectations
of German households (Panel A) and firms (Panel B). “Increase 2020” is a dummy taking value one if
the respondent received the forecast predicting a policy rate increase in 2020, and zero if the respondent
received the forecast predicting an increase in 2025 at the earliest. The outcomes in Panel A Columns 7
and 8 and Panel B Column 5 are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation in the corresponding
sample. In contrast to Table 4, the regressions do not control for additional variables. Robust standard
errors are displayed in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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B Expectations about Policy Rates from Pre-Corona Period
We provide additional evidence on information frictions using our surveys conducted
in 2019, i.e., prior to the coronavirus pandemic, on the ifo Investment Survey and on a
representative household sample. We compare households’ and firms’ forecasts to those
of experts participating in the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Firms and
households had been anchored on the policy rate of zero percent that prevailed at the
time of the surveys before reporting their expectations. We winsorize predictions at -0.5
percent and 2 percent across all datasets for expositional purposes, but our findings are
not sensitive to this choice.
Results Panel A of Figure B.1 displays the cumulative density function of firms’ and
experts’ beliefs about the ECB policy rate 2021. Since our main firm survey in December
2019 did not allow us to elicit prior beliefs due to the paper and pencil format, we rely
on a question we included in the previous regular round of the ifo Investment Survey
conducted in September and October 2019, which we compare to expert forecasts from
the October 2019 round of the SPF. As can be seen, firms’ expectations are quite closely
aligned with those of the professional forecasters. Firms predict a policy rate of 0.22 per-
cent on average for the year 2021, while experts predict a policy rate of 0.04 percent on
average. Moreover, 80 percent of firms in our sample expect a policy rate between 0 per-
cent and 0.5 percent, within the range of forecasts given by the professionals.
Panel B of Figure B.1 shows the cumulative density function of household expectations
about the ECB policy rate in 2022 as well as expert predictions taken from the January
2020 round of the SPF. Households on average expect a policy rate of 0.51 percent for the
year 2022, higher than the average rate predicted by experts (0.09 percent). Moreover,
64 percent of households in our sample expect a policy rate between -.4 percent and 0.5
percent, within the range of the expert forecasts.
Discussion In line with our main evidence, households’ expectations about policy rates
seem to be less aligned with those of experts compared to firms’ expectations. There
are some caveats one should keep in mind in the interpretation of these results from our
2019 surveys. First, given that we provided both firms and households with informa-
tion about the current policy rate, the differences in expectations we detect in this survey
can be seen as a lower bound (see our evidence on the effect of the anchor in Section
2.6). Second, firms’ and households’ expectations concern different reference years, 2021
and 2022, which is due to availability of expert forecasts only for 2021 at the time of the
October 2019 round of the ifo Investment Survey.
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Panel B: Households vs. Experts
Notes: Panel A shows the cumulative distribution functions of firms’ and experts’ expectations about
the policy rate in 2021 based on a supplementary survey question in the regular ifo Investment Survey
conducted in September and October 2019 and the October 2019 round of the ECB SPF, respectively.
Panel B shows the cumulative distribution functions of households’ and experts’ expectations about the
policy rate in 2022 based on a representative household survey conducted in December 2019 and the
January 2020 wave of the ECB SPF, respectively. Predictions are winsorized at -0.5 percent and 2 percent
across all datasets for expositional purposes.
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C Reweighting Exercise for Comparison with Coibion et
al. (2018b)
We document that deviations from expert forecasts and dispersion in expectations are
more pronounced among German households than among German firms. This contrasts
with Coibion et al. (2018b), who find similar degrees of bias and dispersion in samples of
households and firms in New Zealand. One potential explanation for the differences be-
tween our findings and those in Coibion et al. (2018b) are observable differences between
the samples of firms from New Zealand and Germany. This Appendix section provides
details on the reweighting exercise that we use in Section 2.7 to shed light on this issue.
Specifically, we first reweight our sample of German firms such that it is similar in observ-
ables to the firms in the New Zealand sample of Coibion et al. (2018b), and then compare
the distributions of expectations in the reweighted firm sample to our original firm sam-
ple and our sample of households. For this purpose, we use the micro data of firms in
New Zealand in the first survey wave of Coibion et al. (2018b). The data are publicly
available at the AEA website for replication purposes.
We reweight the firms in our sample to make them similar to the New Zealand firms with
respect to the number of employees, export status, and industry composition, as these
variables appear to be the most important correlates of deviations of firms’ expectations
from expert forecasts in our data (see Table 2). To keep the number of firms per cell suffi-
ciently high, we create 18 cells based on three groups of firm size (less than 20 employees,
between 20 and 49 employees, and 50 and more employees)1, two groups with respect to
export status (exporting firm vs. non-exporting firm), and three groups of broad indus-
tries (manufacturing, services, and retail/wholesale trade).
As documented in Columns 1 and 3 of Table C.1, our sample of firms differs substantially
from the sample used by Coibion et al. (2018b).2 First, there are 31 percent small, 23
percent medium-sized, and 46 percent large firms in our sample of German firms. By
contrast, there are 73 percent small, 15 percent medium-sized, and 12 percent large firms
in New Zealand.3 Second, our sample consists of 35 percent manufacturing firms, 37
percent services firms, and 28 percent retail and wholesale firms. In New Zealand these
shares are 14 percent, 54 percent, and 32 percent, respectively. Third, 61 percent of firms
in the German sample export, while only 8 percent of firms in New Zealand export.
1We choose thresholds at 20 and 50 employees for the sake of comparability with the summary statistics
on New Zealand firms reported in Coibion et al., 2018b.
2Table C.1 presents the distribution of firms reporting inflation expectations to our survey. As the distri-
butions of firms reporting policy rate or unemployment expectations differ only slightly, we do not present
the distributions of firms for these cases. To construct the reweighted samples for policy rate or unemploy-
ment expectations used in Table A.4 and Figure A.7, we conduct the reweighting exercise separately for the
respective subsamples of firms.
3Importantly, Coibion et al. (2018b) use sample weights to ensure representativeness of their sample of
firms with respect to the universe of firms in New Zealand. Consequently, we target the distribution of
their reweighted firm sample using the sample weights provided in their micro data. However, the results
of the reweighting exercise are similar if we target the firm distribution in their raw data.
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Then, firms in each of the 18 size class × export status × industry cells are reweighted
such that the distribution of cells in the reweighted German sample mimics the distribu-
tion of firms in New Zealand. As can be inferred from Columns 2 and 3 of Table C.1,
the reweighted sample of German firms is similar to New Zealand firms in terms of the
number of employees, export status, and industry composition. Table A.4 and Figure A.7
compare the distributions of macroeconomic expectations in our reweighted sample with
our unweighted firm sample and our household sample.
Table C.1: Summary Statistics of Reweighting Exercise for Comparison with Coibion et
al. (2018b)
German Firms NZ firms
(1) (2) (3)
unadjusted reweighted
Number of employees e:
e < 20 0.31 0.73 0.73
20 ≤ e < 50 0.23 0.15 0.15
e ≥ 50 0.46 0.12 0.12
Exporter 0.61 0.08 0.08
Manufacturing firm 0.35 0.14 0.14
Services firm 0.37 0.54 0.54
Retail/Wholesale firm 0.28 0.32 0.32
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics of our sample of German firms and firms in New Zealand
with respect to the number of employees, export status, and industry composition, as these variables appear
to be the most important correlates of deviations of firms’ expectations from expert forecasts in our data
(see Table 2). Column 1 presents statistics for the German sample of firms reporting inflation expectations
to our survey (see Footnote 2). Column 3 presents statistics for New Zealand firms based on the micro
data of the first survey wave of Coibion et al. (2018b), which is publicly available at the AEA website for
replication purposes. We reweight the New Zealand sample based on the sample weights used by Coibion
et al. (2018b) for the sake of comparability to their results. Column 2 presents statistics for the reweighted
sample of German firms after targeting the distribution of firms in New Zealand that is used in Table A.4
and Figure A.7.
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D Additional Evidence: Effects on Other Expectations about
the Macroeconomy and Own Circumstances
Our main focus is on the relative strength of information frictions among firms and house-
holds. However, our December 2019 survey also allow us to provide evidence on the role
of expectations about future monetary policy in shaping respondents’ expectations about
the broader economy and their own situation. Forward guidance about the future path
of policy rates has become a frequently used tool to change agents’ expectations about
future inflation in environments where the policy rate has reached the zero lower bound.
Macroeconomic Expectations Learning that the central bank is planning to leave inter-
est rates low for longer than previously thought could also affect firms’ and households’
expectations about unemployment and inflation. On the one hand, agents could perceive
more accommodating monetary policy to lead to higher demand, resulting in lower un-
employment and higher inflation. On the other hand, the central bank’s decision to keep
interest rates low for longer could be perceived as a reaction to negative news about future
demand, leading agents to expect higher unemployment and lower inflation (Wiederholt,
2015). The question of how economic agents interpret forecasts about the timing of policy
rate hikes is central for monetary policy communication, and ultimately determines the
potential of forward guidance about future interest rates to change economic decisions.
As shown in Table D.1 below, households exposed to the “Increase 2020” treatment ex-
pect somewhat higher inflation in 2022 and somewhat higher unemployment in 2020.
Movements of inflation and unemployment expectations into the same direction are in-
consistent both with a view that lower interest rates lead to higher demand and with an
interpretation that lower policy rates are a reaction to lower demand. Instead, they are
consistent i) with households taking a “supply-side” view of the world, and interpret-
ing the announcement of lower interest rates as the central bank’s reaction to a negative
supply shock; or ii) with households perceiving a positive effect of interest rate hikes on
inflation, consistent with recent evidence (Andre et al., 2019). However, changes in ex-
pectations are insignificant for inflation in 2020 and unemployment in 2022, are only of
small size, and do not persist in a four-week follow-up.
Expectations about Own Circumstances This is also reflected in households’ expecta-
tions about labor income growth and personal unemployment risk, and firms’ expecta-
tions about changes in their product prices, the growth of employee wages, as well as
changes in demand or profit margin, which are all unaffected by the information (Ta-
ble D.1). Taken together, the policy rate forecast has no strong effects on expectations
about aggregate unemployment or inflation or on households’ and firms’ expected own
income and business situation.
Discussion These findings suggest that communication about the duration of the zero
lower bound environment may not be successful in changing economic agents’ expecta-
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tions about the broader economy or their own circumstances beyond the effects on inter-
est rate expectations. These findings are in line with evidence by Coibion et al. (2020a)
that information about policy rates has no meaningful effects on households’ expecta-
tions about aggregate unemployment. However, in contrast to our findings, Coibion et
al. (2020a) detect stronger reactions of households’ inflation expectations to interest rate
projections in an environment outside the zero lower bound.
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Table D.1: Effect of Provision of Expert Forecasts on Expectations about Macroeconomy























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Households main
Increase 2020 0.023 0.043∗ 0.076∗ 0.076 0.128 -0.280 -0.361
(0.018) (0.023) (0.042) (0.063) (0.200) (0.564) (0.586)
Observations 3940 3897 3940 3911 3866 3953 3943
R2 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.13
Panel B: Households main
follow-up sample
Increase 2020 0.032 0.047∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.115 0.117 -0.055 -0.474
(0.021) (0.027) (0.049) (0.075) (0.226) (0.683) (0.741)
Observations 2405 2305 2358 2308 2450 2533 2528
R2 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.14
Panel C: Households follow-up
Increase 2020 0.003 0.060 0.204∗ 0.157 -0.052 0.563 -0.351
(0.042) (0.045) (0.109) (0.121) (0.221) (0.654) (0.714)
Observations 2405 2305 2358 2308 2450 2533 2528


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel D: Firms
Increase 2020 -0.002 -0.014 -0.026 -0.115 0.273 -0.087 -0.054 0.018
(0.036) (0.063) (0.065) (0.121) (0.297) (0.205) (0.092) (0.095)
Observations 452 442 458 452 459 459 465 466
R2 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.03
p-value(A=D) 0.523 0.396 0.185 0.159
Notes: This Table examines the effect of the randomized information provision on posterior expectations
about the macroeconomy and own circumstances of households (Panels A through C) and firms (Panel D).
“Increase 2020” is a dummy taking value one if the respondent received the forecast predicting a policy
rate increase in 2020, and zero if the respondent received the forecast predicting an increase in 2025 at the
earliest. Panel A displays the immediate effect in the December 2019 household survey. Panel C reports the
effects of the information treatment in a four-week follow up in January 2020. Panel B presents the results
based on the main survey in December 2019 for those households that are also in the sample of Panel C.
Panel D depicts the results for the firm survey from December 2019. In all regressions we control for the
same variables as in Table 4. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. * denotes significance at
10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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E Survey Instructions: September 2020 Surveys
E.1 Survey Instructions in English (Firms September 2020)
Due to space constraints, each firm participating in the ifo Business Survey (IBS) only re-
sponded to two questions in total (in addition to the regular questions). For this purpose,
the sample of firms was randomly divided into six groups. To indicate the ordering and
assignment of questions to these groups, we refer to “G1Q1” as the first question firms
in the first group received, while “G6Q2” refers to the second question firms in the sixth
group were assigned to, and so on.
Expectations about Interest Rates: No Anchor
[G3Q1 and G4Q2:] What do you think will the policy rate be on average in 2022: __%
[G6Q1:] What do you think will the policy rate be on average in 2025: __%
Expectations about Interest Rates: With Anchor
[G1Q2 and G2Q1:] Currently the policy rate of the ECB is 0%. What do you think will the
policy rate be on average in 2022: __%
[G5Q1:] Currently the policy rate of the ECB is 0%. What do you think will the policy rate
be on average in 2025: __%
Expectations about Inflation and Unemployment
[G3Q1 and G4Q2:] What do you expect the inflation rate to be over the year 2022? __%
[G1Q1 and G2Q2:] What do you expect the unemployment rate to be on average in the
year 2022. __%
Trust
[G5Q2 and G6Q2:] How much trust do you have in the economic forecasts of experts? __
(1 = no trust at all, 7 = very high trust).
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Additional Questions from IBS
In addition to these supplementary survey questions, we use the following survey ques-
tions from other modules and waves of the IBS:
Impact of Coronavirus Crisis [September 2020]: Do you realize an effect of the Corona
pandemic on your current business situation? Is this effect negative or positive?
negative  −3  −2  −1  0  +1  +2  +3 positive
Equity Ratio [September 2020]: How high was your company’s equity ratio at the end
of 2019? __%
Cash to Total Assets [September 2020]: How high were the “cash and cash equivalents”
of your company in % of total assets in June 2020? __%
Any Change in Loan Interest Rate in last 6 Months [September 2020]: Has the interest
rate your company pays on loans changed since March 2020?  yes  no
Level of Education of Respondent [February 2020]: What is your highest educational
degree? Categories:
 Below highschool  A-levels (or equivalent)  Completed vocational training  Bach-
elor or master (vocational)  Diploma or Master (University)  Doctorate  Other
Export Share [September 2018]: What percentage of your sales does your company/firm
generate abroad? __%
Founding Year [September 2018]: In which year was your company/firm founded? __
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E.2 Survey Instructions in English (Households September 2020)
Attention Check
The next question is about the following problem. In questionnaires like ours, some-
times there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and just quickly click
through the survey. This means that there are a lot of random answers which compro-
mise the results of research studies. To show that you read our questions carefully, please
enter “Very strongly interested” and “Not at all interested” as your answers to the next
question. How interested are you in politics?
Very strongly interested - Strongly interested A little bit interested - Almost not interested
- Not at all interested
Explanation
Over the course of this survey we will repeatedly ask you things about your household,
for instance about the net income of your household. By household we mean all fam-
ily members whom you share your primary residence with, excluding housemates and
subtenants.
Background Characteristics
What is your current employment relationship? full-time employed - part-time employed
- self-employed (full-time) - self-employed (part-time) - job-seeking/unemployed - re-
tired/pensioned - housekeeping - in full-time education/apprenticeship - parental leave
- temporary leave from work - permanent leave from work other: __
What is your gender? male - female
What is your age? 18-24 - 25-34 - 35-44 - 45-54 - 55-64 - over 64
What do you think is your household’s monthly disposable net income? Disposable net
income refers to the amount of income that the household has available after taxes and
transfers.
Which federal state do you live in?
What is your highest level of education?
School-leaving certificate from: Special school - Lower secondary school - Polytechnic sec-
ondary school (POS), 8th grade (GDR degree) - Secondary school - Polytechnic secondary
school (POS), 10th grade (GDR degree) - Advanced technical college - High school - Ex-
tended comprehensive school (EOS) (GDR degree) or professional education with Abitur
(GDR degree) - Other: __
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Expectations about Interest Rates: No Anchor
What do you think will the policy rate be on average in 2022: __%
How certain are you about your estimate about the development of the ECB policy rate?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
What do you think will the policy rate be on average in 2025: __%
How certain are you about your estimate about the development of the ECB policy rate?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
Expectations about Interest Rates: With Anchor
Currently the policy rate of the ECB is 0%.
What do you think will the policy rate be on average in 2022: __%
How certain are you about your estimate about the development of the ECB policy rate?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
What do you think will the policy rate be on average in 2025: __%
How certain are you about your estimate about the development of the ECB policy rate?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
Expectations about Inflation and Unemployment
What do you expect the inflation rate to be over the year 2022? __%
How certain are you about your estimate about the development of the inflation rate?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
What do you expect the unemployment rate to be on average in the year 2022. __%
How certain are you about your estimate about the development of the unemployment
rate?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
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Trust
How much trust do you have in the economic forecasts of experts? (1 = no trust at all, 7 =
very high trust).
How much trust do you have in the ECB? (1 = no trust at all, 7 = very high trust).
Numeracy
Next we would like to ask you five questions to see how people use numbers in everyday
life.
In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale, a sofa costs 300 Euros.
How much will it cost in the sale? __
Let’s say you have 200 euro in a savings account. The account earns ten per cent inter-
est per year. Interest accrues at each anniversary of the account. If you never withdraw
money or interest payments, how much will you have in the account at the end of two
years?
__
In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a 10,000 Euro prize are 1%. What
is your best guess about how many people would win a 10,000 Euro prize if 1,000 people
each buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS? __people
If the chance of getting a disease is 10 percent, how many people out of 1,000 would be
expected to get the disease? __people
The chance of getting a viral infection is 0.0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how many of
them are expected to get infected? __people
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was
2% per year. After one year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this
account?
More than today - The same as today - Less than today
Please tell me whether this statement is true or false: Buying a single company’s stock




Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid
taking risks when it comes to financial investment? 1 - Unwilling to take risk; 10 - Fully
prepared to take risk.
Are you generally a patient person or an impatient person? 1- Very patient; 10 - Very
impatient.
How often have news about the policy rate of the European Central Bank (ECB) come to
your attention in the last two weeks? Never - Once - Between 2 and 3 times - Between 4
and 5 times - More than 5 times
How often have news about interest rates in general come to your attention in the last
two weeks? Never - Once - Between 2 and 3 times - Between 4 and 5 times - More than 5
times
How often have news about the inflation rate come to your attention in the last two
weeks? Never - Once - Between 2 and 3 times - Between 4 and 5 times - More than 5
times
How often have news about the unemployment rate come to your attention in the last
two weeks? Never - Once - Between 2 and 3 times - Between 4 and 5 times - More than 5
times
To what degree do you agree with the following statements? fully agree, rather agree,
neither agree nor disagree, rather disagree, fully disagree
• I usually follow news about the economy.
• My job security depends on the overall business cycle.
• A recession would impair the financial situation of my household.
Coronavirus Perceptions
What influence does the coronavirus crisis exert on the economic situation of your house-
hold?
Very negative influence - Negative influence - No influence - Positive influence- Very pos-
itive influence
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Do you worry about your health or the health of other household members because of
the coronvirus crisis?
No worries at all - Little worries - Moderate worries - Big worries - Very big worries
Assets and Debt
What do you estimate the value of your household’s current accounts, savings accounts
and demand deposit accounts to be? (Please enter zero if your household does not hold
any current accounts, savings accounts or demand deposit accounts)
__
What do you estimate the value of your household’s total holdings of stocks and stock
mutual funds to be? (Please enter zero if your household does not hold any stocks/stock
mutual funds.)
__
What do you estimate the value of your household’s total holdings of other financial
assets including money market funds, building loan contracts, or government and corpo-
rate bonds to be? (Please enter zero if your household does not hold any other financial
assets.)
__
What do you estimate the total value of your household’s holdings of real estate, includ-
ing your primary residence (if it is owned by your household) to be? (Please enter zero if
your household does not own any real estate.)
__
What do you estimate your household’s total outstanding housing debt (mortgage debt
and home equity loans) to be? (Please enter zero if your household does not hold any
housing debt.)
__
What is your estimate of your household’s total outstanding non-housing debt? This in-
cludes installment loans, outstanding balances on credit cards, student loans, and auto
loans. (Please enter zero if your household does not hold any non-housing debt.)
__
Additional Demographics II
How many people live in your households?
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In which industry do you work? [drop-down]
What is your main occupation? [drop-down]
Who is the main earner in your household?
You - Your spouse - You and your spouse earn the same amount - Another person
Who in your household is most knowledgeable regarding the finances of your house-
hold? By this we mean the household member who has the best overview of income,
financial accounts, pension schemes, and real estate holdings.
I am most knowledgeable about the household’s finances. - My spouse is most knowl-
edgeable about the household’s finances. - My spouse and I are equally knowledgeable
about the household’s finances - Another person.
Does your household use your main residence . . .
. . . as main owner - . . . as partial owner - . . . as renter - . . . for free
Does your household own stocks or stock mutual funds?
Yes - No
For which party have you voted in the general election of 2017?
Conservatives - Social Democrats - Greens - Liberals - Alternative for Germany - Left -
Other - Have not voted - Prefer not to say
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F Survey Instructions: December 2019 Surveys
F.1 Survey Instructions in English (Firms December 2019)
Information Treatment
Arm: Increase 2020
Currently the policy rate of the ECB is 0%. According to an expert who regularly partici-
pates in an expert survey of the ECB, the policy rate of the ECB will rise to a higher level
in the third quarter of 2020 (next summer).
Arm: Increase 2025
Currently the policy rate of the ECB is 0%. According to an expert from a German Bank,
the policy rate of the ECB will rise to a higher level at the earliest in 2025 (in five years).
Macroeconomic Expectations
Over the course of this survey we will repeatedly ask you things about your assessment
in percentage terms. If you think that the respective probability/percentage change is
X%, then please enter X.
Inflation refers to the percent increase in the general price level measured by the so-called
Consumer Price Index. What do you expect the inflation rate to be in the following years?
__% over the year 2020.
__% over the year 2022.
The current unemployment rate in Germany is 5.0%. What do you expect the unemploy-
ment rate to be on average in the following years?
__% in the year 2020.
__% in the year 2022.
Credit Market Perceptions
How difficult do you think it is (will be) for German firms with similar characteristics as
your firm (sector, number of employees, revenue) to . . .
a) . . . currently take out a loan to finance investment? very difficult - difficult - neither
difficult nor easy - easy - very easy
b) . . . take out a loan to finance investment in 2022? very difficult - difficult - neither hard
nor easy - easy - very easy
What do you think would be the interest rate that German firms with similar characteris-
tics as your firm (sector, number of employees, revenue) would have to pay on average if
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they...
a) ... take out a loan to finance investment today? The interest rate would be __%
b) ... take out a loan to finance investment in the year 2022? The interest rate would be
__%
Business Expectations
By how many percent will the following quantities change each year on average over the
next three years? (If you expect a decrease, please enter negative percent value.)
Average price of your Firm’s products __%
Average hourly wage of your firm’s employees __%
How will the following quantities change until the end of 2022 compared to today?
. . . the demand for your firm’s products? strongly increase - increase - neither increase nor
decrease - decrease - strongly decrease
. . . the profit margin of your firm? strongly increase - increase - neither increase nor de-
crease - decrease - strongly decrease
Interest Rate Expectations
In what year do you think will the policy rate of the ECB rise to a level above 0%?
____ .
What do you think will the policy rate be on average ...
__% in 2022
__% in 2025
How certain are you about your expectations about the policy rate of the ECB?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
News Consumption
How often in the last two weeks came news about the key interest rate of the European
Central Bank (ECB) to your attention? Never - Once - Between 2 and 3 times - Between 4
and 5 times - More than 5 times
Trust in ECB
How much trust do you have in the ECB? Please enter a number between 0 and 10 (0 =
no trust at all, 10 = very high trust).
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Information about the Respondent
How much influence do you personally have in your firm when it comes to the following
decisions:
. . . investment decisions?
very much influence - much influence - neither much nor little influence - little influence
- very little influence
. . . production decisions?
very much influence - much influence - neither much nor little influence - little influence
- very little influence
. . . personnel decisions (recruitment and dismissals)?
very much influence - much influence - neither much nor little influence - little influence
- very little influence
What fraction of the revenue of your company is generated abroad?
__% within the euro area (excluding Germany)
__% outside the euro area
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F.2 Survey Instructions in English (Households December 2019)
Attention Check
The next question is about the following problem. In questionnaires like ours, some-
times there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and just quickly click
through the survey. This means that there are a lot of random answers which compro-
mise the results of research studies. To show that you read our questions carefully, please
enter “Very strongly interested” and “Not at all interested” as your answers to the next
question. How interested are you in politics?
Very strongly interested - Strongly interested A little bit interested - Almost not interested
- Not at all interested
Explanation
Over the course of this survey we will repeatedly ask you things about your household,
for instance about the net income of your household. By household we mean all fam-
ily members whom you share your primary residence with, excluding housemates and
subtenants.
Background Characteristics
What is your current employment relationship? full-time employed - part-time employed
- self-employed (full-time) - self-employed (part-time) - job-seeking/unemployed - re-
tired/pensioned - housekeeping - in full-time education/apprenticeship - parental leave
- temporary leave from work - permanent leave from work other: __
What is your gender? male - female
What is your age? 18-24 - 25-34 - 35-44 - 45-54 - 55-64 - over 64
What do you think is your household’s monthly disposable net income? Disposable net
income refers to the amount of income that the household has available after taxes and
transfers.
Which federal state do you live in?
Prior Beliefs about Interest Rates
Currently the key interest rate of the ECB is 0%.
When do you think will the policy rate of the ECB rise to a level above 0%?
The policy rate will rise to a level above 0% in the year ____ .
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What do you think will the policy rate be on average ...
. . . in 2022: __%
. . . in 2025: __%
How certain are you about your expectations about the ECB policy rate?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
Information Treatment
On the next page you will receive an expert forecast about the future development of the
ECB policy rate. Please carefully review the forecast, you will not be able to go back to
that page. On the next page you can only proceed after 5 seconds.
Arm: Increase 2020
Currently the policy rate of the ECB is 0%. According to an expert who regularly partici-
pates in an expert survey of the ECB on the future economic development, the policy rate
of the ECB will rise to a higher level in the third quarter of 2020 (next summer).
Arm: Increase 2025
Currently the policy rate of the ECB is 0%. According to an expert from a German Bank,
the policy rate of the ECB will rise to a higher level at the earliest in 2025 (in five years).
Macroeconomic Expectations
In what follows we will ask you some questions about the aggregate economy.
Inflation refers to the percent increase in the general price level measured by the so-called
Consumer Price Index. A decrease in the general price level is called deflation (negative
inflation). The current rate of inflation in Germany is 1.1%. What do you expect the
inflation rate to be in in the following years?
__% over the year 2020.
__% over the year 2022.
The current unemployment rate in Germany is 5%. What do you expect the unemploy-
ment rate to be on average in the following years?
__% in the year 2020.
__% in the year 2022.
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Perceived Credit Constraints
How easy would it be for your household to take out a loan to finance consumption ex-
penditures?
. . . currently: Very easy - Somewhat easy - Neither easy nor difficult - Somewhat difficult
- Very difficult
. . . in 2022: Very easy - Somewhat easy - Neither easy nor difficult - Somewhat difficult -
Very difficult
How easy would it be for your household to take out a mortgage loan?
. . . currently: Very easy - Somewhat easy - Neither easy nor difficult - Somewhat difficult
- Very difficult
. . . in 2022: Very easy - Somewhat easy - Neither easy nor difficult - Somewhat difficult -
Very difficult
Credit Market Expectations
Imagine your household wants to take out a loan to finance consumption expenditures.
What do you think would be the interest rate your household would have to pay on such
a loan?
. . . currently: __%
. . . in 2022: __%
Imagine your household wants to take out a fairly large mortgage. What do you think
would be the interest rate your household would have to pay on such a loan?
. . . currently: __%
. . . in 2022: __%
What do you think is the interest rate your household could earn by saving on a savings
account?
. . . currently: __%
. . . in 2022: __%
Personal Income and Unemployment Expectations
The next question is about the net labor income of your household. By net labor in-
come we mean the amount your household earns through either self-employment or
wage earnings after taxes and transfers. What do you think, in percentage terms, how
much higher or lower will be your households’ total net labor income in 2022 compared
to today? If you expect a lower net labor income, please enter a negative number.
What do you think, by how many percent will your households’ total net labor income
change each year on average over the next 3 years? If you expect a decrease, please enter
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a negative number. __%
What do you think is the probability that you will be involuntarily unemployed for at
least 3 months in the following years? . . . 2020: __% . . . 2022: __%
Posterior Expectations about the Interest Rate
We want to ask you again for your assessment regarding the development of the interest
rate.
When do you think will the key interest rate of the ECB rise to a level above 0%?
The key interest rate will rise to a level above 0% in the year ____ .
What do you think will the key interest rate be on average ...
. . . in 2022: __%
. . . in 2025: __%
How certain are you about your expectations about the ECB interest rate?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
In this question we present you three scenarios about the average level of the key interest
rate in 2022. For each scenario, please let us know the percent chance you assign to the
event that this scenario happens. The probabilities of the three scenarios have to sum up
to 100 percent.
The key interest rate in 2022 will on average be. . .
. . . higher than today: __%
. . . as high as today: __%
. . . lower than today :__%
sum: __%
Trust in ECB
How much trust do you have in the ECB? Please enter a number between 0 and 10 (0 =
no trust at all, 10 = very high trust).
Assets and Debt
What do you estimate the value of your household’s current accounts, savings accounts
and demand deposit accounts to be? (Please enter zero if your household does not hold
any current accounts, savings accounts or demand deposit accounts)
__
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What do you estimate the value of your household’s total holdings of stocks and stock
mutual funds to be? (Please enter zero if your household does not hold any stocks/stock
mutual funds.)
__
What do you estimate the value of your household’s total holdings of other financial
assets including money market funds, building loan contracts, or government and corpo-
rate bonds to be? (Please enter zero if your household does not hold any other financial
assets.)
__
What do you estimate the total value of your household’s holdings of real estate, includ-
ing your primary residence (if it is owned by your household) to be? (Please enter zero if
your household does not own any real estate.)
__
What do you estimate your household’s total outstanding housing debt (mortgage debt
and home equity loans) to be? (Please enter zero if your household does not hold any
housing debt.)
__
What is your estimate of your household’s total outstanding non-housing debt? This in-
cludes installment loans, outstanding balances on credit cards, student loans, and auto
loans. (Please enter zero if your household does not hold any non-housing debt.)
__
Additional Demographics I
How many people live in your households?
What is your highest level of education?
School-leaving certificate from: Special school - Lower secondary school - Polytechnic sec-
ondary school (POS), 8th grade (GDR degree) - Secondary school - Polytechnic secondary
school (POS), 10th grade (GDR degree) - Advanced technical college - High school - Ex-
tended comprehensive school (EOS) (GDR degree) or professional education with Abitur
(GDR degree) - Other: __
Did you complete vocational training, for example an apprenticeship? Or do you have a
qualification from a university, university of applied sciences, or university of cooperative
education?
Company apprenticeship - Semi-skilled training - Training at a school of public health -
Training at a vocational school - Master certification, engineering diploma or comparable
- Certification from a university of cooperative education - Certification from a university
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of applied sciences or from a teacher training college - Certification from a university -
Other: __
In which industry do you work? [drop-down]
What is your main occupation? [drop-down]
Numeracy
Let’s say you have 200 euro in a savings account. The account earns ten per cent inter-
est per year. Interest accrues at each anniversary of the account. If you never withdraw
money or interest payments, how much will you have in the account at the end of two
years?
__
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was
2% per year. After one year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this
account?
More than today - The same as today - Less than today
Please tell me whether this statement is true or false: Buying a single company’s stock
usually provides a safer return than a share of a stock mutual fund with the same value.
True - False
Additional Demographics II
Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid
taking risks when it comes to financial investment? 1 - Unwilling to take risk; 10 - Fully
prepared to take risk.
Are you generally a patient person or an impatient person? 1- Very patient; 10 - Very
impatient.
How often in the last two weeks have come news about the key interest rate of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) to your attention? Never - Once - Between 2 and 3 times -
Between 4 and 5 times - More than 5 times
How often in the last two weeks have come news about interest rates in general to your
attention? Never - Once - Between 2 and 3 times - Between 4 and 5 times - More than 5
times
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To what degree do you agree with the following statements? fully agree, rather agree,
neither agree nor disagree, rather disagree, fully disagree
• I usually follow news about the economy.
• Firms are usually better informed about the interest rate policy of the ECB than I
am.
• My job security depends on the overall business cycle.
• A recession would impair the financial situation of my household.
Who is the main earner in your household?
You - Your spouse - You and your spouse earn the same amount - Another person
Who in your household is most knowledgeable regarding the finances of your house-
hold? By this we mean the household member who has the best overview of income,
financial accounts, pension schemes, and real estate holdings.
I am most knowledgeable about the household’s finances. - My spouse is most knowl-
edgeable about the household’s finances. - My spouse and I are equally knowledgeable
about the household’s finances - Another person.
Does your household use your main residence . . .
. . . as main owner - . . . as partial owner - . . . as renter - . . . for free
Does your household own stocks or stock mutual funds?
Yes - No
For which party have you voted in the general election of 2017?
Conservatives - Social Democrats - Greens - Liberals - Alternative for Germany - Left -
Other - Have not voted - Prefer not to say
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F.3 Survey Instructions in English (Follow-up Households January 2020)
Attention Check
The next question is about the following problem. In questionnaires like ours, some-
times there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and just quickly click
through the survey. This means that there are a lot of random answers which compromise
the results of research studies. To show that you read our questions carefully, please enter
turquoise as your answer to the next question. What is your favorite color?
Explanation
Over the course of this survey we will repeatedly ask you things about your household,
for instance about the net income of your household. By household we mean all fam-
ily members whom you share your primary residence with, excluding housemates and
subtenants.
Posterior Expectations about the Interest Rate
In what follows we will ask you some questions on your expectations about the aggregate
economy and your own economic circumstances in the next years.
When do you think will the key interest rate of the ECB rise to a level above 0%?
The key interest rate will rise to a level above 0% in the year ____ .
What do you think will the key interest rate be on average ...
. . . in 2022: __%
. . . in 2025: __%
How certain are you about your expectations about the ECB interest rate?
very certain - certain - uncertain - very uncertain
Macroeconomic Expectations
Inflation refers to the percent increase in the general price level measured by the so-called
Consumer Price Index. A decrease in the general price level is called deflation (negative
inflation). What do you expect the inflation rate in Germany to be in the following years?
__% over the year 2020.
__% over the year 2022.
What do you expect the unemployment rate in Germany to be on average in the following
years?
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__% in the year 2020.
__% in the year 2022.
Perceived Credit Constraints
What do you think, how easy will it be for your household in 2022 to take out a loan to
finance consumption expenditures?
Very easy - Somewhat easy - Neither easy nor difficult - Somewhat difficult - Very difficult
What do you think, how easy will it be for your household in 2022 to take out a mortgage?
Very easy - Somewhat easy - Neither easy nor difficult - Somewhat difficult - Very difficult
Credit Market Expectations
Imagine that in the year 2022 your household wants to take out a mortgage. What do
you think would be the annual interest rate your household would have to pay on such a
loan?
. . . in 2022: __%
Imagine that in the year 2022 your household wants to take out a loan to finance consump-
tion expenditures. What do you think would be the annual interest rate your household
would have to pay on such a loan?
. . . in 2022: __%
What do you think will be the annual interest rate your household can earn by saving on
a savings account in the year 2022?
. . . in 2022: __%
Additional Demographics
In what year were you born?
__
What do you think is your household’s monthly disposable net income (in euro)?
Disposable net income refers to the amount of income that the household has available
after taxes and transfers.
What is your gender? male - female
What is your age? 18-24 - 25-34 - 35-44 - 45-54 - 55-64 - over 64
Which federal state do you live in?
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Did you answer the question in this survey truthfully? Yes - No
What do you think is the purpose of this study?
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